



Daily Report

West Europe

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7 February 1996

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January 1996

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Daily Report

West Europe

FBIS-WEU-96-026

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International: Russia's Zyuganov Addresses West

BR0502151296 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian
3 Feb 96 p 8

[Interview with Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, by Fernando Mezzetti in Davos; date not given: "You Must Trust Us, Westerners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mezzetti] Mr. Zyuganov, the win by the reborn Communist Party, led by yourself, in the recent Russian election has given rise to concern in various Western circles. What do you think of the views that they have expressed? [Mezzetti ends]

The face of the mathematician and official of the disbanded CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], who now heads the new Russian Communist Party, lit up at the question, as if it was just what he had been waiting for. The annual conference of the World Economic Forum witnessed his debut on the international stage before an audience of heads of state and government, multinationals, and major banks. He wanted to make himself known and, above all, to rap the knuckles of a West that, he said, understands nothing about Russia today: an exercise in reassurance, which he performed in a long speech full of enthusiasm and sarcasm.

[Zyuganov] In Europe and the United States they do not understand what is going on in Russia. This saddens me, but it alarms me even more. Those who are worried by our victory should be alarmed at the explosive situation into which Yeltsin has gotten us instead. We are on the edge of a precipice. If it goes on much longer, we will plunge into catastrophe.

[Mezzetti] But Yeltsin inspires confidence in his Western counterparts.

[Zyuganov] I know, and I cannot understand it. They talk about democracy in Russia, but Yeltsin took advantage of the bullets that were flying about to write his own Constitution, which gives him immense powers: the powers of a Pharaoh, a czar, a secretary general of the defunct CPSU, or even a U.S. president: all that in the hands of a man who cannot even control himself. They talk about security, but there are thousands of nuclear warheads under no known control, especially in Ukraine. On the domestic front, the country is in the hands of the criminal classes, while the state is disintegrating. It places exorbitant taxes on private enterprise but is not even capable of collecting them; evasion is running at 50 percent. There is next to no foreign investment, and a large proportion of privatized companies are closing down. Industrial output is lower than it was when the Germans were at the gates of Moscow in 1942. Thousands of workers are not

receiving their wages, and the mining areas have turned into powder kegs where no one from the government dares to show his face to the unpaid miners. Whole military units are not receiving their salaries, and a man bearing arms could even resort to using them just to obtain food. Intellectuals and scientists are going hungry. It would hardly surprise me if a few scientists went off to make atomic bombs for other countries, nor would it surprise me if the Chechen bands came out with the atomic threat. Anything may happen. Does the West have confidence in a Russia that has sunk to these depths?

[Mezzetti] They say it is for the sake of international stability, although they are aware of the domestic problems.

[Zyuganov] You call that stability? Our domestic hazards are so serious that they jeopardize international security. Russia could turn into one big Chechnya, and with Russia running adrift, what sort of stability would there be? The equation of the international balance of power, with the United States as leader, the European Union as a major power, and Japan and China coming on, contains a lot of unknown quantities aggravated by Russia's role as the great sick man of the present day. If Russia vanishes from the equation, sucked into the void, the whirlpool, and internal disorder, it will take much more than UN peacekeeping forces, much more than NATO intervention along the lines of the former Yugoslavia. We are just a step away from catastrophe. The Soviet Union and its might made everything more predictable in international relations.

[Mezzetti] Missing the USSR? If your party were in power, what would you do about the now independent republics?

[Zyuganov] Do you really think that we would want the Caucasian republics back, with all that is going on there? Let them keep themselves to themselves. Nobody is thinking of taking the Baltic countries back. The problem is to establish normal relations with the various republics and to work together like in Western Europe. But instead there is tension and animosity.

[Mezzetti] And on the domestic front?

[Zyuganov] Nobody wants to go back to the old system, which was already in need of reform back in the sixties. Reform was necessary, but gradual reform, not ruthless and rash, hitting and humiliating the weakest, in other words the majority of the population. We are in favor of political pluralism, of several parties, but with a different balance of powers, and of an economic system comprising private property and free enterprise. In society, we want respect for individual and

religious values, with the state having responsibility for education, hospitals, defense, and the arts. What can we call such a system? There is socialism, and there is certainly more socialism in Italy or in France today than there is in Russia. But we carry a lot of weight; we have 40 percent in parliament and we will fight for it, especially in the approach to the presidential election in March, and with a view to that we may even consider a coalition designed to beat Yeltsin.

UN: Preview of Iraqi-UN Talks on Lifting Embargo

BR0602145396 Paris LE FIGARO in French

6 Feb 96 p 6

[Article by Claude Lorieux: "Iraq-United Nations: First Try Against Embargo"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The major round of haggling beginning today in New York between Iraq and the United Nations will undoubtedly focus less on an exchange of "oil for food" as such, and more on the prestige of the two "opponents."

The aim is to come up with a way of bending the embargo that has been in place since the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and of authorizing Baghdad to sell a limited quantity of oil in order to purchase food and drugs. [passage omitted]

So far Saddam Husayn had rejected this compromise, which he felt was incompatible with Iraq's dignity. [passage omitted]

So what has changed to make Saddam Husayn finally accept — after ignoring it for so long — not the entirety of Resolution 986, but at least to negotiate a way of putting it into practice?

One thing is obvious. With the exception of a privileged minority, the Iraqis are living in increasingly worse conditions. After returning two weeks ago from a "mission to Iraq" with two colleagues from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Jean-Bernard Raimond was given indications at a meeting with the UN specialist agencies (UNICEF, WHO, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and so on) "concerning the increase in infant mortality, the fall in life expectancy, an increase in various epidemics, and the effects of malnutrition." The joy expressed by many Iraqis upon hearing news of the negotiations in New York says a great deal about the suffering which the embargo has caused.

Continuation of the Gulf War

However, it still takes a leap to imagine that Saddam Husayn has finally been moved by the suffering of his people. When asked if Baghdad's "go-ahead" to the opening of talks was due to humanitarian or politi-

cal reasons, Jean-Bernard Raimond answered unhesitatingly: "Primarily political. Everything is political." The former foreign minister, who engaged in long talks with the Iraqi president, added: "After a few hours there, it became clear that as far as the Iraqi leadership is concerned the embargo is a political concept. It is the continuation of the Gulf War by other means." In Mr. Raimond's view, Baghdad's primary aim is to "break out of the status quo and reestablish itself within an international context." [passage omitted]

France Steps Up its Missions

Nevertheless, a number of countries are indignant about the human consequences of the embargo. At the risk of upsetting America, France has stepped up its missions to Baghdad and has received Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz in Paris. Paris has asked Baghdad to be realistic. Russia, whose new foreign minister, Yevgeniy Primakov, is very familiar with Baghdad, has also intervened in order to convince the head of state to take up the challenge presented in Resolution 986.

"Tariq 'Aziz does not acknowledge Resolution 986. But he knows that for the first time Mr. Butrus-Ghali has some maneuvering room," explained Jean-Bernard Raimond, who met twice with the Iraqi deputy prime minister in Baghdad. One of these arrangements concerns oil markets, with the United Nations leaning toward the oil pipeline that ends in Turkey, while Iraq favors the Mina al-Bakr terminal at the Chott el-Arab. Another arrangement favors the system of distributing food and drugs to the Kurds.

The bargaining is likely to take some time. A well-placed diplomat sums up the challenge like this: "Butrus-Ghali must be able to tell the Security Council: 'I have applied Resolution 986.' Tariq 'Aziz must be able to tell his president: 'The arrangements for applying the resolution have changed.'" That way everyone will save face. At this stage — and in an election year in the United States — that is the essential thing for the politicians. Otherwise, as far as the people are concerned...

War Crimes Tribunal: Cassese on Serb, Croat Cooperation

BR0602144596 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian

4 Feb 96 p 13

[Interview with Antonio Cassese, chairman of the International Tribunal on War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia, by Pietro Veronese in Rome; date not given: "We Will Achieve Justice in Three Years"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Rome — [passage omitted] Recently Cassese and South African prosecuting attor-

ney Richard Goldstone have toured the three war capitals — Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Belgrade, seeking the cooperation of the governments involved. The chairman of the court himself provided LA REPUBBLICA with an account of his talks.

"The authorities in Sarajevo are cooperating fully, but they have no control over the parts of the territory in the hands of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. So they cannot execute arrest warrants. Obviously they have every desire to extend the authority of their police throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, so they are trying to do what they can.

"Croatia has given the prosecuting attorney permission to open an office in Zagreb and to have a representative conducting investigations locally. But it has never executed any arrest warrants. Consider that two of the seven suspect Croatian or Bosnian Croat criminals live undisturbed right in Zagreb. One of them, Tihomir Blaskic, an army officer, was actually promoted to the rank of brigadier general after we indicted him. They offered us a compromise: to try them while they are at liberty, but this is something that our penal procedure does not envisage. But the Croatian Government is very sensitive to anything that could set back its possible future accession to the European Union, and this is a good means for us to bring pressure to bear."

[Veronese] What about in Serbia?

[Cassese] Of the 52 arrest warrants issued by the Court in The Hague, 43 are for Belgrade Serbs or Bosnian Serbs. Hitherto there has been a complete refusal; and the court's legality has even been denied. So much so that we were forced to release a suspect Bosnian Muslim criminal, who was arrested in the Netherlands, because Belgrade never supplied us with the evidence given by witnesses against him.

I have had intensive, tough, and very frank talks with Foreign Minister Milutinovic. In other words, we said quite frankly what we thought. I pointed out to him that the Dayton accords oblige them to cooperate with us; that failure to cooperate is one of the reasons that could lead to the reintroduction of sanctions; that the three officers accused of crimes committed at Vukovar and resident in Belgrade must be arrested and handed over to the Court. Milutinovic and his colleague at the Justice Ministry promised me their cooperation.

[Veronese] NATO has refused to take on the task of executing the arrest warrants...

[Cassese] That is not true. If the people against whom we have issued arrest warrants encounter a patrol, road block, or identity check, IFOR troops will arrest them and hand them over to us immediately. This is a for-

mal agreement, and we have with commander-in-chief Leighton Smith an excellent operational understanding, the details of which I am not authorized to divulge. What IFOR is not willing to do is to seek them out. For instance, to capture by military means a militia leader barricaded up with his militiamen. NATO troops do not want to be identified as a judicial police force, and this is an understandable request on their part.

[Veronese] It may be understandable, but the impression is that the Dayton accords definitively ratified the international court's impotence.

[Cassese] Look, our fear was that Dayton would grant war criminals a barely concealed amnesty. That is, that it would entrust each of the three states with the task of arresting and trying their own criminals, in which case that would have been that. But this did not happen. The agreement and its supplementary documents contain innumerable very binding rules and obligations that facilitate our work enormously.

[Veronese] Will IFOR cooperate in the inquiries into the mass graves that have been discovered in Bosnia?

[Cassese] General Leighton Smith has given assurances that his troops will enable our investigators to carry out their work in complete safety. It will be a long investigation; we are reckoning on a minimum of six weeks for each of the graves, keeping in mind that they are very numerous — though we have decided to keep the total number a secret. It will require very precise forensic work, all the more complex inasmuch as some of the massacres date back to November 1992.

[Veronese] Attorney Goldstone has said that he will soon be leaving the Court, and this has been viewed as a sign of crisis.

[Cassese] When Goldstone accepted the post Nelson Mandela had just appointed him to the South African Constitutional Court. We reached a secret agreement, he, I, and UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali: Goldstone would stay with the Court in The Hague for two years. And so he has. To replace him we have already submitted a list of four candidates to Butrus-Ghali. He has chosen one: I can tell you that it is a woman, who is excited about the task that awaits her. All that is needed is a Security Council vote, and I expect that to take place in a few days' time.

[Veronese] How long will it take to provide justice for the victims?

[Cassese] Two or three years, by which time we will have tried a least some of the major criminals. We will have issued a message that is close to our hearts. The world will never again leave war crimes unpunished.

War Crimes Tribunal: Goldstone Discusses Cooperation

BR0602145196 Hilversum Nederland-3 Television Network in Dutch 2134 GMT 2 Feb 96

[Interview with South African lawyer Richard Goldstone, chief prosecutor at the Hague tribunal on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, by Pieter de Vink; place and date not given: Goldstone and De Vink speak in English with Dutch subtitles; transcribed from the English; from the "Nova" program — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [De Vink] In two years' time there is just one indicted person in custody, a relatively small fish, Mr. Tadic.

[Goldstone] I don't look at it like that. The Bosnian Serb former leaders have been isolated. The tribunal is being taken seriously. With every step we take we are asked why we are not already taking the next step. I don't believe that's a sensible or fair way of looking at the work of this tribunal.

[De Vink] But politically speaking, we have to deal with people like Milosevic and Tudjman. People who were accused not so long ago of being architects of ethnic cleansing.

[Goldstone] I am not concerned about accusations that are made by politicians. This is not a political organization; this is a legal, professional organization.

[De Vink] But you are working in the field of politics.

[Goldstone] That may be, but we don't take political decisions. And I don't think it is relevant to ask me for comment on political accusations made by nonprofessionals, by nonlawyers. People who don't have evidence that they can present to us to justify the allegations they make.

[De Vink] But politics must have influence on your job.

[Goldstone] No, not at all. I wouldn't say this if I were not sure.

[De Vink] Then again, why is it that we never hear about the big fish, people like Karadzic and Mladic. They are still free men.

[Goldstone] That is the fault of the Bosnian Serbs who are not prepared to comply with their international

obligations and arrest and surrender people that we indict.

[De Vink] Do you believe the court will ever be able to catch those big fish?

[Goldstone] You are in as good a position as I am to look into a crystal ball and I'm cautiously optimistic that there is a good prospect of that happening.

[De Vink] But who is going to arrest these people? Who is going to extradite these people?

[Goldstone] They now are arrestable and hand-overable in Bosnia-Herzegovina in terms of the new constitution of that country which was agreed to at Dayton. So, in fact they are no longer free to move around in their own country, let alone in another country.

[De Vink] Meaning, they are prisoners in their own country?

[Goldstone] That's correct.

[De Vink] Again my question, sir, who is going to hand them over?

[Goldstone] The authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[De Vink] The other day you were in America. Did you convince the Americans that they have to live up to their commitment to the work of the court?

[Goldstone] I didn't need to do that because they were aware of it. Certainly, I don't think anybody can suggest that we haven't had the very fullest cooperation from the United States. I always put the United States and the Netherlands in the same category of countries who have set an example of the fullest possible support and cooperation for the tribunal. So, I didn't have to convince anybody in the United States.

[De Vink] Then why is it that you are still haggling with NATO's Admiral Leighton Smith, when you were there about the assistance for your investigators...

[Goldstone interrupting] I don't accept your categorization of it. I have never had to haggle with Admiral Leighton Smith. I have had one meeting with him and at that meeting his support was unequivocal. [passage omitted]

EU: EC Vice President Brittan on UK Role

MS0702093896 London THE TIMES in English
7 Feb 96 p 18

[Article by Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President European Commission, EC: "Riskind Should Beware"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Last year there was an increasing realisation on both sides of the Atlantic that the relationship between Europe and the United States remained the most important relationship for each party, but that recent developments, such as the end of the Cold War and the successful Gatt negotiation, made its modernisation essential.

As European Commissioner in charge of relations with America, I put to the Commission and the Council of Ministers last summer a proposal that the EU and the US should launch a major initiative to strengthen ties in a whole range of policies. This was warmly welcomed by the Americans, and after months of negotiation the initiative was crowned in Madrid last December, when President Clinton joined the EU in signing the blueprint for this new relationship.

Throughout the process, the Commission worked closely with the Spanish presidency and was bolstered by valuable support from Britain, Germany and others who see transatlantic ties as vital to their national interests. The Commission is now pressing ahead with a similar initiative towards Canada.

There can be few European policies which dovetail so neatly with British interests. Most significantly of all, the initiative has kept alive the flame of freer trade across the Atlantic which is very dear to Britain. It does not create a full free trade area, but if, after a joint study by the Commission and the American Government, it is deemed politically, economically and legally feasible to cut all tariffs, a free trade area could ultimately result.

So far so good. A substantial advance in transatlantic relations, one of Britain's major foreign policy objectives, has been achieved by the European Union with no help from the anti-European tub-thumpers in Westminster, but with great support from the British Government. It has been achieved by making friends and influencing people in Europe. That is proof if proof were needed, that a positive attitude to Europe pays far more dividends than the penny-wise and pound-foolish approach of defending "national sovereignty" at all costs.

Britain on its own could not have achieved this major step. But by joining with EU partners who share Britain's priorities, effective action was possible. This illustrates the point made by Raymond Seitz, former American Ambassador in London, that Britain can max-

imise its influence on America by working through Europe. The realistic choice for Britain is not between America and Europe. It is, rather, between seeming semi-detached from and hostile to Europe — as the Eurosceptics wish — and being positive towards Europe and therefore influential in strengthening the transatlantic relationship. If Britain wants to go further, as the Foreign Secretary's most welcome speech yesterday suggests, it must persuade its EU partners that free trade with America is in their interest too. The EuroAmerican initiative proposed by Brussels and backed by all 15 EU countries shows that in advocating closer relations Britain is pushing at a door already two-thirds open.

That door will open wider only if others feel that Britain wants to strengthen rather than dilute Europe by removing more barriers to trade with America. In my view, persuading them of this is perfectly possible, provided that the Foreign Secretary's positive approach is not distorted by those wishing to misrepresent it as giving encouragement to Eurosceptics who wish to detach Britain from Europe. These objectives can be achieved only through Europe.

The same applies to the removal of economic barriers worldwide. Europe as a whole, negotiating as a single unit, has opened far more world markets than any one country could have done on its own, as even the most blinkered sceptic would be hard pushed to deny. The biggest bonfire of trade barriers that the world has ever known was ignited by Brussels through Gatt, with the support of Britain and other countries. Those who had blocked the deal in the past were won over because the advocates of free trade convinced them that Europe would be stronger in the world as a result. And hard though it is for Euro-sceptics to swallow, the European Commission was the toughest advocate of them all.

The British people are told by much of the media to see every policy emanating from across the Channel as threatening our right to govern ourselves, not as a chance to boost our influence. The development of Europe's relationship with America shows how untrue this is.

This Government must show that such fears are unfounded, and must highlight the benefits of EU membership. It has chosen to do so in its reaction to the new era in Euro-American relations, and wisely so. It must apply the same approach elsewhere, weighing up every issue in the balance of British interests, rather than heeding those who cry "Save our sovereignty" whenever anything comes from Brussels, however much it may be in Britain's and Europe's interest.

Austria: Country Seen Beginning To Examine Its Past

AUS702132/96 Vienna PROFIL in German 5 Feb 96 pp 18-22

[Report by Marianne Enigl and Herbert Lackner "Buried History"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Caspar Enem should already have some practice. When last Thursday (1 February) the interior minister contacted friendly U.S. Ambassador Swanee Hunt for the second time in 10 days, it was again about something that had been buried. The matter with the weapons will soon be resolved — thank you again — but did the Americans at that time perhaps also...

The way the earth at the building site in Lambach had just revealed bones was like a metaphor for the Austria of the 1980's and 1990's. Everywhere history is coming to the surface, like an old ski glove in the spring sun.

Since election day on 17 December there has been little time to think about the election result and its consequences. The country has been extremely busy, first with a gathering of incorrigible geriatrics in Krumpendorf, then with the Third Nationalrat President's strange ideas about Engelbert Dollfuss and Adolf Hitler, then with mysterious U.S. arms depots, and, most recently, with the skeletons found on the banks of the Traun river.

Oh yes, there were also negotiations on forming the government.

The newly elected Nationalrat has met twice so far in the 50th legislative period since the end of the war. The first time it discussed the Waffen SS, the second time death marches to concentration camps and prisoner-of-war camps.

Last year's great debates are still echoing. How did we treat the Romanies in the past, Austria wondered in February 1995, after a pipe bomb ripped four men of that ethnic group to shreds. "Liberated or defeated?" was the question on the 50th anniversary of the collapse of the Nazi regime at the beginning of April.

The budget crisis, the collapse of the coalition, and the calling of early elections were able to divert attention only briefly. Soon the issue once again was whether an Austrian defense minister should really attend the strange meeting of veterans at Ulmsherg. Wolfgang Schüssel ("We need these votes, too") said yes and sent Werner Paulabend to Carinthia.

There they perhaps discussed — as the entire country was soon to — the Wehrmacht exhibition, which pointed out the blood on the allegedly clean uniforms of the fighting troops. In this connection, the "Gudenus

case" emerged briefly — that is, Movement for Freedom (F) Deputy Gudenus was obliged to give up his seat because he said he only believes in the existence of pay chambers "because it is prescribed by dogma."

Then it was time for Krumpendorf.

For about 10 years a nation has been more and more frequently burying its nose in the narrow confines of its history. Its representatives have been staggering clumsily through the long deserted labyrinth of a past they have not come to terms with.

The controversy over the bodies at Lambach is a model for the course of such conflicts.

— Almost anyone "who builds a house" comes across such "bones." Upper Austria Provincial Governor Josef Puchringer, who obviously does not suffer much from piety, observed in exasperation at first, rejecting demands to delay construction.

— Then a former prisoner-of-war spoke up, claiming to have witnessed the burial of fellow-prisoners in summer 1945. There is a slight problem. The men are said to have been buried in uniform, and so far no uniforms have been found.

— A Mr Horst Littmann, an expert of the "Black Cross" organization, which looks after soldiers' graves, then thought that he could determine "on the basis of the shape of the skulls and the teeth" that the dead were clearly not "of the Slav type." This made Puchringer think immediately of "transferring" the skeletons.

— At the same time an expert on graves of the Israeli Community went to work. In contrast to his ethnologically inspired predecessor, he did not want to rule out that the dead were indeed Jews, whose remains must stay where they are for religious reasons.

Within hours, the debate thus reached the most sensitive regions of the Austrian soul.

It seems to crave such issues, contemporary issues ensure high ratings on television. Peter Rahl's discussion on the "Zur Sache" television program on the Wehrmacht exhibition placed the program's ratings among the top five in its time slot even though a James Bond movie was carried on the second channel as a mega-competitor. The exhibition itself was seen by 12,000 paying visitors in Vienna — twice as many as had seen it previously in Hamburg, according to exhibition organizer Walter Manowick.

Austrian publishers' catalogues are full of books on recent history. According to the analysis of Boettcher, the leading publisher in this area, "Research into National Socialism is attractive to a small, specialized circle of

interested people. General contemporary history is a good seller.

This century's dramatic history is of concern to both the left and the right. If we hold a discussion about the budget, we get three people to attend; if we discuss a historical issue, we get 150. Luitgar Huebel, Joerg Haider's historical adviser, says about his experiences with events in the F's Education Institute:

Why do the Austrians have a tendency to look back and be introspective: what is the reason for their almost masochistic desire alternately to treat and reopen barely healed wounds? It must be something like part of the national character. Erhard Busek thinks. Even the big names in Austrian literature — Joseph Roth, Franz Werfel, Robert Musil — made their living by looking back to the monarchy. We have a tendency to look back and that is why there is hardly any intellectual engagement with the present.

Can there in fact be any such engagement as long as the past still lies undigested like a lump of lead in the stomach and assessment of it splits the population into two camps?

In a Fessel poll in 1992 41 percent of those polled thought that National Socialism brought "only good things" or at least "both good and bad things."

When eight years ago a working group of the large opinion research institutes started to investigate the extent of anti-Semitism, the result was ambivalent. "The proportion of Austrians who have a certain antipathy toward the Jewish people is ... 28 percent. These are set off ... by as many Austrians who express sympathetic feelings for the Jews — and about 40 percent have neither sympathetic feelings nor antipathy for them."

As late as in December 1995 54 percent agreed with the sentence: "Hitler helped Austria to experience an economic upswing."

"How can one have ever done away with National Socialism, if there has been no consensus about what it meant in Austria?" contemporary historian Florian Freund says.

Erika Weinzierl, the doyenne of this science, sees the problem lying in the continuity of the two republics.

Eleven years after 1934 the same people formed a coalition and, naturally, avoided a discussion about the First Republic. In 1949 the VdU [Association of Independents] was established as a collecting pond for those who were "burdened" which means that then the years 1938-45 became only material for the parties' tactical games.

The "balance of guilt" engendered additional agency. As political scientist Anton Penzka of Innsbruck says:

This worked along the lines of: "If you say that my [Cardinal] Innitzer was enthusiastic about the An-schluss, I say the same about your Renner."

Even though the past was never discussed, it was experienced once again in some areas.

For a long time 12 February was virtually a sacred holiday for the Social Democrats; on this day poignant memorial services were often held all over Austria. In 1973 there were turbulent scenes in parliament when a back-bencher of the Austrian People's Party told Bruno Kreisky [then chancellor], who was once again talking about this issue, that with 1934 he could "wade into him" [den Hibel ausblasen].

History as the glue of the community of like-minded people — this existed on the other side too, as Erhard Busek was able to see in his parish in Vienna's ninth district in the 1950's. "During the processions socialist kept throwing stones at us. Subsequently our organ player took courage from drink and played 'God save ... [national anthem at the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire]. This was his kind of revenge."

Clarity was (and is) not desired. Even today it is almost impossible for historians to obtain files relevant to contemporary history in the provinces. At the end of the 1980's British contemporary historian Robert Knight had to sneak secretly into the archives as he able to do research for his book about the postwar governments' delaying tactics regarding reparations. [Footnote cited] (Robert Knight: "I Am in Favor of Delaying the Matter," Frankfurt/Main 1988).

Simon Wiesenthal also had such experience: "When a war criminal who had 15,000 Viennese Jews on his conscience went on trial in Frankfurt at the beginning of the 1960's, I went to Justice Minister Broda and said: Please send a public prosecutor there. There they will also talk about accomplices who are still in Austria. Broda just said: I do not have a budget for that."

Pushing things aside, tactical calculations, and lack of interest were probably joined by another reason: collective fatigue with history. "The fact that we have not come to terms with our history is also linked with the fact that this tumult took place within a very small area," contemporary historian Oliver Rathkolb says, citing his grandfather's life. "He was born in the monarchy, and lived through World War I, the violent First Republic, the dictatorship of the corporate state, the Anschluss and Nazi rule, World War II and the occupation. When things finally quieted down, in the 1960's, he died."

Recent history — too much for one man, too much for a small people?

After the end of the war the Austrians gratefully clung to the "Moscow Declaration," in which the allies reassured them in 1943 that their country was "the first victim of Nazism." They demonstratively distanced themselves from the Germans, the "Piefkes," who were actually to blame for everything.

Last year sociologists at Graz University presented test subjects with the historically completely untenable sentence: "Even though Hitler was born in Austria, he got his ideas in Germany." A total of 54 percent of the polled agreed, only 19 percent said that this was incorrect.

Anyone who speaks of accepting a share of the blame would be dirtying his own nest. In June 1991 Chancellor Franz Vranitzky made a start and said in Parliament: "Many Austrians were involved in oppression and persecution, some of them in prominent places."

Public applause was meager.

"The Germans are doing this differently," former Defense Minister Friedhelm Frischenschlager has noticed. "They say: This is our history — now we must do things better." This is also what Frischenschlager himself tried when, as defense minister of the Freedom Party of Austria, he held swearing in ceremonies in the Karl-Marx-Hof and in the former concentration camp Mauthausen. His efforts were destroyed at a stroke when he welcomed former war criminal Walter Reder with a handshake when he was sent back to Austria from Italy. Even in the mid-1980's there was such insensitivity in politics: Frischenschlager and the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Austria, who had been previously informed of his Reder mission, were completely surprised by the public reaction.

Since Waldheim's election and the almost simultaneous emergence of Joerg Haider, recent history has been a constant guest in the center of politics. "The conflict is also louder because in our country there is a far more strongly oscillating sounding board," as Heinz Fischer said.

The conflict is loud, Anton Pelinka agrees with the Nationalrat president, particularly "because for 10 years the parties have used contemporary history as a club with which to beat each other about the head."

Fischer does not deny the tendency to use the past in a way that is opportune in daily politics: "Sometimes in our country history is certainly exploited by one side and then exploited by the other side in re-verse."

Wherever politics and historical research coexist in such a strange symbiosis, science is sometimes beaten itself. According to the television recording of Joerg Haider's speech at Ulrichsberg in 1990, he said: "...those who invent castles in the air at their desks, such as historian Weinzierl (laughter in the audience), who seriously thinks that this is obsolete (restlessness in the audience). The time will come when such historians will be obsolete (cheers, applause)."

Even people more beyond suspicion are fed up with dwelling on the past. "It cannot be good for any one of us, in particular not for young people, constantly to hear these discussions, these debates about the time 50 years ago," new Styrian provincial Governor Waltraud Klasnic, for instance, said, demonstrating intellectual simplicity, in one of her first comments.

And Bernd Schilcher, president of the Provincial School Council, whose intellectual capacity was expected to be somewhat greater, grumbled in view of the discussion about the Klasnic/Brauneder barter deal, which is unpleasant for the Styrian conservatives, that soon "we will 'all need an anti-Aryan identity card.'"

Is the debate over yet?

In some other countries it has not even started

In Spain, for instance, where fascists and Republicans tore into each other in a bloody civil war between 1936 and 1939, there were discussions even after the death of dictator Francisco Franco in 1976. Franco's statues, to be found all over the country, have largely remained untouched.

In Italy, where part of the elite defected to the camp of Mussolini's opponents already in 1943, the fascist traditions are unbroken. It is often pointed out that anti-Semitism was imported only by the German allies and that Italians were hardly involved in excesses. As if it were a matter of course, a neo-fascist party is running for elections, a party that with some of its territorial claims — for instance toward Slovenia — links directly with the Duce.

What coming to terms with the past can also be like is currently being demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia. Anton Pelinka: "They are now repeating all the civil wars and massacres of this century once again." He adds: "In our country the excitement after the war was postponed to later generations. That may not be a bad thing at all."

Luxembourg: Juncker on EU Institutional Reforms
BR0702132496 Paris LE FIGARO in French
6 Feb 96 p 4

[Interview with Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker by Baudouin Bollaert in Luxembourg; date not given: "Europe: Jean-Claude Juncker Spokesman for the 'Small Member States'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bollaert] What are your feelings upon arriving?

[Juncker] When a Luxembourg goes to France he does not have the feeling that he is going abroad. We have a French sensitivity. I do not know whether in the relations between our two countries there is a uniquely Luxembourg added value. Then again, I can confirm the French notion that in Europe French constitutes an exception. That is what you call France's grandeur and what I would call the French example, to paraphrase someone else.

[Bollaert] And is there a Luxembourg example?

[Juncker] The view people have of Luxembourg does not always tally with reality. People say it is a fiscal paradise, a major financing center without any hinterland, and that everything can be attributed to chance. They forget that at the start of the century it was a very poor agrarian country without any industry. Our flair is for knowing how to combine the meaning of work with the reality of our geographical situation. Nothing that is done in Luxembourg can be explained in terms other than what is going on among our neighbors.

[Bollaert] Hence the importance you attribute to the French-German understanding?

[Juncker] It is vital for us all. It is a key factor in the driving force behind Europe. I regard it as more reassuring than dominating or threatening. To my mind this understanding is as good today as it was 10 or 15 years ago, contrary to what some people are saying or writing.

[Bollaert] Six weeks away from the Intergovernmental Conference [IGC] on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty, have you come with a special message?

[Juncker] In a large EU member state like France I believe I can ensure that the viewpoint of the smaller or very small member states is taken into account. The small countries know that they are small. But they do not like to be treated as second-class member states on a daily basis. I am not saying that the French Government treats them in that way. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the attitude in France regarding the role of these small and large member states is dangerously eclipsing the

objective of the IGC. The aim of this conference must go well beyond a mere institutional shake-up.

[Bollaert] France, among other things, is proposing a smaller Commission, a voting system that takes greater account of Europe's demography, and a "senior representative" for common foreign and security policy [CFSP]. What do you think of this?

[Juncker] I would be inclined to say "no" to these ideas if they are not the logical result of genuine political progress. If we take the Union as it is and leave it in virtually the same state after one year of negotiations, what is the point of changing it? After all, our institutions do not work as badly as people say they do.

But if the IGC enables us to replace the unanimous vote by the qualified majority vote — where virtually all procedures are concerned — and if the European Parliament's powers of co-decision develop, moreover if we establish a CFSP worthy of the name and enter into the third stage of European Monetary Union [EMU], I can imagine that we might ring in some changes to the Union's decisionmaking system. On the other hand, I rule out the possibility of seeing some countries deprived of their representative in the Commission. All the member states need such visibility.

[Bollaert] How and where should the [scope of the] qualified majority vote be extended?

[Juncker] The Maastricht Treaty comprises three pillars: one Community pillar (the single market) and two intergovernmental pillars (the CFSP, and judicial and police business). I think it should be applied to these three pillars each time it proves more efficient and politically possible to do so. If we went in the direction of a qualified majority vote in the area of CFSP, I would go along with a weighting of votes that favored the large countries more. In practice this would mean that in a key area of their sovereignty they would agree for the first time to share their prerogatives with the small member states. Consequently they would be entitled to certain guarantees.

[Bollaert] Would you be prepared to accept a similar arrangement regarding the first pillar?

[Juncker] No. I have extensive experience with voting in this area and I have never seen the larger countries on one side and the pack of smaller countries, on the other. By untiringly putting this point back on the table the large countries will end up making the small countries believe that they are large! I do not need anyone to write in a treaty that Luxembourg is smaller than France or Germany. I know that fact and I behave accordingly.

[Bollaert] You favor continued unanimity regarding fiscal matters.

[Juncker] Indeed, it seemed difficult to me to replace it with a qualified majority. For fiscal decisions actually dictate society's choices. Nor does this mean that we must interrupt our striving for harmonization. But if we harmonize our fiscal landscapes, we will have to harmonize our social landscapes too. You cannot have one without the other.

[Bollaert] In your opinion is the IGC deadline linked to the later one to do with the single currency?

[Juncker] If the monetary union failed, the political union would not materialize. If we made no headway during the IGC, monetary union would suffer as a result. And if monetary union and political union did not come about, enlargement would not take place either. So there are three things at stake.

[Bollaert] What will be your position on the debate about EMU?

[Juncker] We are a rule-of-law Community, consequently we should respect the law. I am surprised at the casual manner of those who forget that Maastricht was ratified three years ago! I am against pushing back the calendar for [introducing] the single currency. And the [convergence] criteria are not as severe as is being claimed. The margin of appreciation is specified in the treaty. When the day comes we will have to ask ourselves about the available margin that can be used.

Between now and then let us not discourage those people who are making genuine efforts to fulfill the criteria at a time when, curiously enough, some people are discovering strange virtues in indebtedness.

[Bollaert] What is your prediction regarding the single currency?

[Juncker] I believe in it. Raymond Barre said that it was "the daughter of necessity." I would add that it is not the cousin of chance. If we want to defend the European social model, the way in which we live together, and offer it to the rest of the world, then we must be better organized. So the project goes a lot further than its mere monetary dimension might lead us to believe.

[Bollaert] You say that the GDP of the 12 candidate member states for [EU] membership barely equals that of the Netherlands. Has enlargement been scheduled to take place too quickly?

[Juncker] No. One part of Europe cannot be happy and prosperous if the other part is not. But let us have no illusions: Enlargement cannot take place tomorrow, and not everyone can join at the same time. There will be stages, like in the Tour de France. Otherwise, I believe in the variable geometry method, provided that all the member states share the same final ambitions. We must agree on the objective, with different rhythms applying to different countries. The treaty on EMU is a good example.

UK: Rifkind Discusses EU Foreign, Security Policy
AU0502161796 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 5 Feb 96 p 2

[Interview with British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind by Josef Joffe in Munich; date not given: "The Europeans Lack Military Weight"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Joffe] How will we achieve the impossible: The Europeans want common foreign and security policy but do not want to give up their sovereignty.

[Rifkind] Right, but national interests are increasingly converging. We have meanwhile gotten used to cooperation, and therefore differences are diminishing. We used to have a tradition of conflict in Europe, but today we have one of cooperation. It is not always working, but...

[Joffe] Where are our interests converging — in Bosnia?

[Rifkind] Bosnia is a very good example of cooperation, even though there has not been total agreement. In the Contact Group, England, France, and Germany were good for a good part of the progress.

[Joffe] Still, why could real progress not be achieved until the United States intervened?

[Rifkind] At the beginning, the United States did not bring its entire weight to bear together with the Europeans.

[Joffe] The entire weight of the Europeans was, therefore, not sufficient.

[Rifkind] Of course, not; the United States is a superpower. Realistically, one must admit that Europe cannot bring so much power to bear today. In Bosnia, the greatest handicap of the Europeans was that they could not agree on the use of ground forces. Germany and Italy were not ready for it for historical reasons. Recent trends show that in the future this will be better.

[Joffe] Foreign policy has something to do with rapid, resolute action — with leadership. When several nations have to act the question immediately appears: Who leads, who follows?

[Rifkind] It depends. Each country has its own expertise, depending on the area. Sometimes it is you, some times us....

[Joffe] The British would operate under our leadership?

[Rifkind] We would accept that some countries have more experience in certain areas than others.

[Joffe] Experience confers leadership?

[Rifkind] No, experience means that your judgment or that of the French deserves particular attention. Leadership is something else. Good advice is always something easy to come by. Leadership requires political will as well as military, economic, or diplomatic weight. One problem of the EU is the constant emphasis on political will, while there is always a lack of substance. To bring together a military potential similar to that of the United States, the Europeans would have to double their defense budget. Nobody is considering doing that. Therefore, we must not indulge in unrealistic ambition. That only reduces our credibility. We should only talk about common foreign policy when we have the necessary will and means.

[Joffe] What if we lack the necessary muscle?

[Rifkind] First, you can work on that....

[Joffe] In an era of competitive disarmament?

[Rifkind] Foreign policy does not only have something to do with military policy. Europe is rich, it has great economic power, as well as a central geographical situation. We have great influence on the Mediterranean, the Middle East.

[Joffe] Europe and the rest of the world: Jacques Chirac was the first French president to visit the United States in 12 years. Is that the end of Gaullism — or is it old wine in Atlantic skins?

[Rifkind] A simple visit is not a historic event yet. Nevertheless, it constitutes a kind of change. Behind it is the desire to further develop NATO, and an interest that has gotten closer to the interests of the other Europeans but is not identical with their interests.

[Joffe] Is it the end of Gaullism?

[Rifkind] Not yet. Paris does not want to integrate into NATO's military organization. There is still the vision of a separate European command structure within NATO.

[Joffe] Is the old game going on?

[Rifkind] We must wait and see. There are positive developments — and conflicting signals.

[Joffe] The limit of common foreign policy is always reached when London's and Bonn's Atlantic ties clash with France's continental European ambitions. Will things now become simpler?

[Rifkind] If you force me to say yes or no, I would say yes. But, it is a qualified yes. Only, in Bosnia NATO at least managed to operate out of area.

[Rifkind] NATO or America?

[Rifkind] NATO. The bombing was a NATO initiative.

[Joffe] Americans carried out 80 percent of the sorties.

[Rifkind] True, the Americans also have more. Not so long ago France's participation would have been unimaginable — with one or 100 aircraft.

[Joffe] Germany and England: Relations always look worse than they should be considering the many shared interests. Why?

[Rifkind] Germany and England are always in agreement on the substance of issues. Differences appear regarding the role of institutions. Germany has obviously much greater confidence in the political problem-solving capacity of institutions.

[Joffe] And England?

[Rifkind] We believe that common foreign and security policy is a means to an end, but only one.

[Joffe] And the other means?

[Rifkind] When not all Europeans agree than those who do agree will cooperate. For example in Bosnia. There it was not the EU that acted but half a dozen of the important European nations.

UK: Bank Governor Views European Monetary Union Issue

MS0602113596 London BBC Television Network in English 2100 GMT 5 Feb 96

["Exclusive" interview with Eddie George, Governor of the Bank of England, by Correspondent Peter Morgan, in London, 5 February, from the "Nine O'clock News" program — recorded]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [George] I do think what is really important is that the economic conditions should be right before people move ahead, and that is actually more important than the calendar in my view.

[Morgan] The President of the EU, Jacques Santer, says that if the 1999 deadline is not met the whole EMU [European Monetary Union] project is off, do you agree with that?

[George] Well I don't think that is necessarily true, no, with the greatest respect to Mr Santer. It seems to me that what is really important is that we do all continue to drive towards establishing permanent stability within our countries.

[Morgan] Do you think it is certain there will be a single currency by the end of the century?

[George] No, I certainly would not say it is certain, and I don't think anybody can say that at this stage.

[Morgan] If there is such a high political priority put on achieving monetary union why do we not just accept a softening of the economic criteria?

[George] Oh well I think there are genuine risks that it could prove to be divisive and actually lead to a loss of coherence in Europe rather than to strength Europe as a cooperative entity.

[Morgan] So if someone came to you in 1999 and said, well the economic criteria have not been met, but the political priority is still great, what would your advice be on monetary union?

[George] Oh I would be against it unless the economic conditions were satisfied...

[Morgan, interrupting] Despite the political advantages which have been identified by Herr Kohl [German Chancellor]?

[George] Well as I say, I think that the political advantages would be very considerable if the economic conditions were right, but I think simply to insist upon the political advantage and to take a risk of the economics could risk actually producing political dissension within Europe and achieve quite the wrong result.

UK: Peace Forum Paper on Northern Ireland

MS0602131096 (Internet) Forum for Peace and Reconciliation WWW in English 2 Feb 96

[Final Paper of the Drafting Committee of the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation: "Paths to a Political Settlement in Ireland: Realities, Principles and Requirements"; presented on 2 February 1996; received via Internet 6 February]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

Preamble

The peace process has provided an historic opportunity for a new start for the people in Northern Ireland, on the island as a whole and in relations between the peoples of Ireland and Britain. It has already transformed the daily lives of people in Northern Ireland. It has opened up the possibility of negotiating a lasting political settlement that would be based on parity of esteem and inclusiveness. And it promises the hope that conflict and a security-dominated way of life can be replaced with co-operative structures and new relationships, on a basis of trust. But the beginning of peace has also brought anxiety and uncertainty — both about its permanence and about the risks and requirements of compromise. Healing the pain and grief of those who have suffered, overcoming the legacies of the past, building trust

and reconciliation, and establishing a lasting political settlement and a fair and inclusive society represent formidable challenges that must urgently be addressed.

The Forum for Peace and Reconciliation was established as part of this process. One of the initial issues which it looked at was the concept of a common understanding of the problems we face, and of the principles which might underlie their resolution, as intermediary steps along the path to an overall settlement. Accordingly, each Forum party presented policy statements on the idea — subsequently published under the title: "Paths to a Political Settlement in Ireland" — debated and examined them in detail in the Forum and explored whether, arising from these statements and debates, an agreed position between the parties was possible. The result of that process is this document, setting out (a) the key present realities which require to be addressed and (b) the principles and requirements which should characterise an acceptable political accommodation.

In framing its approach to the twin objectives of the document, the Forum was guided by the reality that there is no commonly accepted analysis, historical or otherwise, of the roots of division and mistrust. Each tradition has its own perspective on history, in common with its own aspirations for the future. The minimal treatment in the document of the historical origins and causes of the conflict reflects the extreme sensitivity of this issue. Notwithstanding the differing historical perspectives, however, it is the Forum's view that progress is possible towards a lasting accommodation.

The document was prepared without the direct input of the main unionist parties, who, so far, have felt unable to take up the invitation to membership of the Forum. However, the Forum, through its process of inclusive dialogue, has had the benefit of the views of many significant groups and organisations whose membership is drawn primarily from the unionist and loyalist traditions. The Forum parties have sought to reflect and take full account of these perspectives in drafting this document. They look forward to a constructive dialogue, embracing as wide and comprehensive a cross-section as possible of the communities North and South, on the approaches proposed in the document.

Present Realities

Arising from its discussions on the nature of the problem, the Forum has identified the following key realities as, in its view, requiring to be addressed:

(a) The most urgent and important challenge facing the people of Ireland, North and South, and the British and Irish Governments together, is to remove the causes of

conflict, to overcome the legacy of history and to heal the divisions which have resulted.

(b) The peace process provides an unprecedentedly favourable climate in which to face this challenge. The opportunity now available needs to be grasped to the full.

(c) Most of the divisions within Northern Ireland and within the island, which are a persisting source of pain and distrust, are part of the enduring historic legacy of wider British-Irish relations. The origins and context of those divisions, therefore, transcend Northern Ireland itself and encompass the totality of relationships involved — i.e. those within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland as a whole and between the peoples of these islands.

(d) In terms of the way ahead, a central role rests with the Irish and British Governments. Building on the evolution of agreed arrangements and positions — starting with the Sunningdale communique, followed by the 1980 Summits, which placed the relationship on a formal footing, and leading over time to the deepened level of co-operation represented by the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Joint Declaration, the Joint Framework Document and the Twin-track Approach — the two Governments have accepted that they have a responsibility to lead the process of overcoming the divisions of the past and the search for a new accommodation acceptable to all. Both Governments having acknowledged their responsibility, it will be essential that they discharge it actively and fully. In the Joint Declaration, the British Government, having declared that it has no self-interest strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland, has accepted that its role will be to encourage, facilitate and enable the achievement of agreement among the people of Ireland through a process of dialogue and co-operation and that it will legislate for any such agreement, while the Irish Government has committed itself to the principle that the democratic right of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

(e) The Forum also notes that the Irish Government has said that no individual party can have a veto over negotiations and discussions over their outcome, and the British Government has said no group or organisation has a veto over the policy of a democratically elected government. The two Governments have also agreed that in political dialogue no outcome is either predetermined or ruled out and that other positions, apart from theirs, will be given full consideration in all-party talks.

(f) The engagement of the political parties, together with the two Governments, in all-inclusive talks, commencing at the earliest possible date, will also be crucial to the achievement of a comprehensive agreement. The political parties will bring to the talks their own analysis and positions on the political and constitutional changes required for the achievement of a new accommodation acceptable to all. To ensure their success, such talks will require careful, sensitive and urgent preparation.

(g) Violence, from whatever source and whatever its rationale, served — particularly in Northern Ireland, but also as between North and South — to deepen divisions, reinforce the barriers of fear and hatred, retard cross-community contact and reconciliation, and has impeded the search for agreement. It caused immense human suffering. For many, the burden of that suffering remains a living and profoundly difficult reality. A compassionate acknowledgement of that reality and a commitment to devote sufficient resources to necessary treatment and support programmes will be important elements of building a true process of reconciliation. Moreover, the cost of violence in economic terms was also on an enormous scale.

(h) By the same token, the ceasefires announced in Autumn 1994 have profoundly altered the situation in Northern Ireland and represent a strongly positive contribution to the process of establishing an agreed settlement. The bringing about of the ceasefires was made possible through the climate created by the commitment of the two Governments to a common approach on core issues, by the work of many individuals and groups within the republican and wider nationalist communities and within the loyalist and wider unionist communities, and by the support and influence of the United States and the European Union. In a more general sense, tribute should also be paid to the many groups and individuals, including within the Churches, who during the years of conflict maintained and developed links across the community divisions, seeking to break down barriers of mistrust and misunderstanding. At a wider level, the ceasefires, and the new climate which they have helped create, have given rise to a deep determination throughout Ireland, North and South, that the advances that have been made must be consolidated and built upon.

(i) Conflict and division now in Northern Ireland primarily result from profound disagreement on its status and on what shape a durable political settlement should take. The absence of consensus on these issues gives rise to many other divisions, including on policing, the administration of justice and also on social, cultural and economic issues. There is however a more open acknowledgement than in the past of the depth and com-

plexity of divisions that exist and a greater awareness of the need to address them.

(j) The profound disagreement amongst the people of Ireland on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland derives from the fact that the two major traditions there define their identities, allegiances and aspirations in terms which transcend Northern Ireland, viz, looking broadly to Britain and Ireland. The Joint Declaration acknowledges that there can be no stability under a system rejected on grounds of identity by a significant minority and there is widespread acceptance of the need for both traditions to feel secure about their future.

(k) The issues of self-determination and consent are fundamental. While it is a view shared by a majority of the people of this island, though not by all its people, that the Irish people as a whole have a right to national self-determination, the exercise of self-determination is a matter for agreement between the people of Ireland and must be based on consent. There is not full agreement about how the principles of self-determination and consent should be exercised. Given their central role in the process overall, the approach reflected in the agreed position of the two Governments on this crucial matter is of particular importance. The British Government recognise that it is for the people of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right to self-determination on the basis of consent freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland if that is their wish; the Irish Government accept that the democratic right of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. This integrated approach by the two Governments to the issues of self-determination and consent has been accepted by the majority — though not all — of the political parties, North and South, representing a large majority of the people of Ireland as a whole. Two further realities apply in this regard: (1) Northern Ireland's current constitutional status reflects and relies upon the present wish of a majority of people there and (2) nationalist support for the above approach to the principle of consent does not imply that the existing status of Northern Ireland commands nationalist consent.

(l) Current attitudes to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, therefore, may be summarised as follows. The present wish of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland is for no change in its constitutional status. Conversely, a substantial minority wish for a sovereign united Ireland, overwhelmingly on the basis that this objective is achieved by peaceful, democratic means. It is

recognised that the option of a sovereign united Ireland, which is also the preferred option of a majority of the people in Ireland, does not command the consent of the unionist tradition, nor, as indicated, does the existing status of Northern Ireland, which is the preferred option of a majority of people there, command the consent of the nationalist tradition. Against this background, and addressing the totality of relationships involved, there is a need for new arrangements and for new structures not simply based on majoritarianism which, on the basis of a new and balanced constitutional accommodation, will reflect the reality of diverse aspirations, reconcile as fully as possible the rights of both traditions, promote co-operation between them, and afford each, on the basis of equality of treatment, secure and satisfactory expression and protection in all spheres of public life.

(m) The divisions between the two communities in Northern Ireland, and between the two traditions on the island as a whole, have been perpetuated and accentuated by an absence, to a large extent, of mutual understanding, of contact and of dialogue between them. This absence of trust, which in some areas of Northern Ireland in particular is compounded by a mutual sense of threat, represents a major obstacle to the negotiation in good faith of an overall political settlement.

(n) The lesson of history is that only through an even-handed and just compromise, achieved without violence or coercion and acceptable to both communities and to both traditions on the island, can a lasting and stable settlement be reached. While the accommodation of the two major traditions remains the primary requirement, such a settlement must also take account of the minority of people, particularly in Northern Ireland, who define themselves as neither unionist nor nationalist in any traditional sense (the "third strand").

(o) There are severe forms of deprivation in Northern Ireland within both communities. Historically, there has been particular discrimination against nationalists and Catholics which has meant the persistence of economic and social disadvantage. All this, apart from its intrinsic unacceptability, represents a barrier to the search for a lasting and comprehensive political settlement. The coming of peace will undoubtedly be of substantial economic benefit to Northern Ireland and the island of Ireland as a whole. The Forum's own study of the social and economic consequences of peace and economic reconstruction suggests that the "peace dividend" will be substantially greater in the context of a political settlement than in that of simple continuation of the ceasefires. It will be essential to ensure that the economic benefits of peace are fully realised, that they accrue to communities, families and individuals most

severely affected by the conflict, that they promote social inclusion and that economic discrimination is redressed.

(p) In North/South terms, the numerous common economic interests, the convergence between the structures of the two economies and the increasing inter-action in the context of peace between the business communities in both parts, in other economic spheres and indeed across a broad range of human activity, bear testimony in practical terms to the need for joint or common approaches.

(q) Major economic, social and cultural changes have taken place in the South over recent decades. These have led to the creation of a more prosperous, diverse and pluralistic society, very different from that which existed prior to 1969. One consequence of this is a development in understanding among many towards the situation in Northern Ireland and a greater willingness to accept unionists in terms of their own self-perception.

(r) The development of European integration will require new approaches between the two parts of the island to serve their economic interests. Participation in the process of European integration has been a significant ingredient in Ireland's recent political and economic development. While the effects of membership have not been felt to the same extent in Northern Ireland, the European Union's supportive response to the ceasefires has served to highlight the positive potential of the European dimension. Already, co-operation on social and economic issues in the EU context has helped to bring people together across the divide in Northern Ireland. Common involvement in the European Union has injected new and constructive elements into relations between Ireland and Britain. European integration holds enormous potential for an accommodation in Ireland, both as a model for the resolution of deep-seated conflicts and as an incentive for a more co-operative approach to the many shared economic, environmental and social problems confronting the two parts of the island.

Principles and Requirements

Having identified and considered these Realities, the Forum proposes the following Principles and Requirements as necessary elements of a political accommodation and settlement — and the process of achieving them — acceptable to all the people of Ireland, North and South.

1. The first principle must be the right to peace, based on justice. Flowing from this right is the principle that the pursuit of all political goals, including the establishment of an overall political settlement, must

be undertaken by exclusively democratic and peaceful means, characterised by dialogue and free from violence and coercion.

2. An essential requirement of an approach based exclusively on dialogue, negotiation and non-coercion will be the building of a true process of trust and reconciliation. Such an approach must take particular account of, and be sensitive to, the position of those who have suffered directly from violence and injustice — from whatever source. In building trust and reconciliation, appropriate action will also be important on the various issues relating to those who have been imprisoned in the context of the conflict.

3. A new beginning, if it is to lead to a comprehensive, lasting resolution of the conflict, must adequately address the totality of the three central relationships involved — within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands.

4. It will be essential that the commitment of the Irish and British Governments to a common approach, as identified in paragraph (d) in "Present Realities" above, is met and that they work in close partnership and collaboration. In addition to their shared functions, each Government will have important separate roles in the process also, some of which were set out in the Joint Declaration and the two Framework Documents. Above all, both Governments must actively and fully honour their commitment to foster agreement and reconciliation, leading to a new political accommodation founded on consent and encompassing all the relationships involved.

5. The achievement of such a new accommodation will require the urgent establishment of an inclusive talks process — carefully and sensitively prepared — involving the political parties as well as the two Governments. Addressing all the relationships involved, the task of the process will be to secure agreement and the maximum degree of consensus on the nature and form of future constitutional, political and institutional arrangements and structures. Having regard, *inter alia*, to practical and legal requirements, the agreed outcome of this process will have to be ratified by the people of Ireland, North and South.

6. The objective of the talks process must be a new political dispensation, representing an honourable, democratic accommodation between the two major traditions with which both can live and which is based on consent and on full respect for the concerns, rights and identities of all. There must be a rejection of any concept of victory or defeat.

7. Agreement on an overall settlement will require, *inter alia*, a balanced accommodation of the differing views of the two main traditions, which takes full account of the conflict of identities and allegiances. In terms of specific constitutional legislation, the two Governments must, on a balanced and even-handed basis, discharge the commitments they have undertaken respectively in this regard in paragraphs 20 and 21 of "A New Framework for Agreement". In particular, they must ensure that, in regard to the people of Northern Ireland, the constitutional changes proposed should be such as not to diminish in any way their existing citizenship rights and their birthright to be accepted as being British or Irish — or both — as appropriate and desired.

8. In determining the nature and extent of constitutional change, the issues of self-determination and consent will be crucial. The Forum believes that in this respect the following principles and requirements should apply:

It is for the people of Ireland alone, North and South, to determine their own future by agreement and consent. While there continues to be disagreement on how the principle of self-determination is to be exercised, a substantial consensus has developed, as indicated in paragraph (k) in "Present Realities" above, around the approach reflected in the agreed position of the British and Irish Governments, *viz*: the British Government recognise that it is for the people of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish; the Irish Government accept that the democratic right of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

Full account must be taken of the realities (a) that Northern Ireland's current constitutional status reflects and relies upon the present wish of a majority of people there and (b) that nationalist support for the above approach to the principle of consent does not imply that the existing status of Northern Ireland commands nationalist consent.

Securing an agreement which can earn and enjoy the allegiance of the different traditions on the island will be a core task of the comprehensive, all-party talks described in paragraph 5 above. Should these talks result in an agreement, and if that agreement were democratically ratified North and South, then the result of that ratification process will represent a valid and legitimate exercise by the people of Ireland as a whole of their right to self-determination.

9. Agreed arrangements based on a new and balanced constitutional accommodation must reflect the reality of diverse aspirations, reconcile as fully as possible the rights of both major traditions, and promote co-operation between them. They must even-handedly afford both traditions parity of esteem and equality of treatment in all spheres. They must enhance and facilitate the development of a truly pluralist ethos throughout the island of Ireland. While the central requirement of a lasting settlement is the forging of an accommodation between the two major traditions, the construction of new arrangements and structures must, against the foregoing background, take due account also of the position of the minority of people, particularly in Northern Ireland, who define their identity in terms which are not reflected by either of those traditions.

10. The consent of the governed is essential to the stability and legitimacy of any political arrangements. Institutions and structures forming part of new political arrangements must be accepted by both major traditions as essential elements of an overall settlement which is honourable and balanced, and must therefore enjoy widespread public support from within both traditions. In this context, and in the context of the totality of relations, it is widely accepted that there can be no exclusively internal Northern Ireland settlement. The precise structuring of relationships within Northern Ireland and their institutional expression will be a matter for the all-inclusive talks process. Equally, the securing of the endorsement and consent of both traditions will require the process to address relationships within Ireland and between Ireland and Britain. In this regard, institutions and structures will be needed which, while respecting both the requirements of identity and the diversity of the people of Ireland, would enable them to work together in all areas of common interest. Such structures would, of course, include institutional recognition of the special links that exist between the peoples of Britain and Ireland as part of the totality of relationships, while taking account of newly forged links with the rest of Europe (see also paragraph 15 below). Such institutions must be democratically accountable and must in their functions be open and transparent.

11. The comprehensive, systematic, effective and entrenched protection of human rights — civil, political, economic and social — should underpin the establishment and operation of agreed institutions and structures. Human rights should be guaranteed, including, if necessary, internationally, on a basis of equivalence throughout all of Ireland, for example, by incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms into domestic law, irrespective of the constitutional context and of any possible future changes

to it. Critical issues in this regard, particularly, but not exclusively, in relation to Northern Ireland, will be the administration of justice and policing — specifically, the development in each case of changes and reforms which will secure the unequivocal support, participation and confidence of all sections of the community. The cultural and linguistic diversity of the people of all traditions, North and South, should be safe-guarded and fostered as a source of enrichment and vitality.

12. Particular attention must be paid to the protection of the rights and identity of any community which in consequence of the applying of the principle of consent finds itself in a minority position, whether in the North, or in the South, or in the island as a whole. It should be the duty of the state in such a situation vigorously, imaginatively and sensitively to protect and promote the interests of such a community, while also upholding the equal rights of the majority tradition.

13. The achievement of greater and more equally-shared prosperity, the promotion of equality of opportunity and fair participation in education and the labour market, the eradication of discrimination, and the empowerment and inclusion of marginalised and deprived communities and groups, are not only vital in themselves, but also have the capacity to create a more stable social environment, in which new political arrangements are more likely to take root and command public confidence. These goals should be, and must be, vigorously pursued.

14. Mutual understanding and contact between individuals, groups, communities, organisations and institutions have an important role in the elimination of barriers of suspicion, in the creation of mutual trust and in the building of confidence and should be further promoted and supported, including financially. Education will have a particularly significant function in this regard. In the matter of schooling, parental choice should be respected and facilitated, including the preferences of those parents who choose integrated and Irish-medium education for their children. There is a need to extend and strengthen programmes that increase contact between pupils and teachers within Northern Ireland and between schools North and South and in Britain. In addition, greater emphasis must be devoted to exchange and mutual understanding programmes and to making the history and full cultural heritage of the people of the island in all their strands, and in its relationship with Britain and with the rest of Europe, available in all schools throughout Ireland.

15. New arrangements should also incorporate a strong European dimension. Changes are mooted in the character and nature of the European Union at political, economic, social and indeed many other levels which will

have profound implications for its member states and regions. New approaches will be required to address the evolving common challenges and opportunities which these developments will hold for both parts of the island and for Ireland and Britain as partners in Europe. A further requirement, therefore, of new arrangements and structures emerging from a comprehensive settlement must be the capability of embracing such a process of evolving change.

16. Each of the foregoing principles and requirements would apply and have equal validity in all constitutional situations, and under all of the institutional frameworks, which may be envisaged [punctuation as received].

Conclusion

The Forum parties believe that the opportunity that now exists to address the roots of conflict, to heal historic divisions, to create a lasting peace and to establish an

honourable and enduring settlement acceptable to all is unprecedentedly favourable. But they acknowledge also that much difficult work lies ahead if the obstacles that remain are to be overcome and if the potential that currently exists is to be realised to the full. It is essential that democratic solutions negotiated on this basis be not undermined by violence or the threat of violence. This requires a total commitment to dialogue, to seeking to understand the fears, concerns and aspirations of the others engaged in the process, and to a spirit of compromise and reconciliation.

For their part, the Forum parties pledge their own commitment to these Principles and Realities and earnestly ask all others involved to do the same. They look forward to a constructive dialogue on this document on as wide and comprehensive a basis as possible.

(dated) 2 February 1996

Germany: Kinkel on NATO Expansion, Russian View

WSO702101096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 6 Feb 96 p 7

[Interview with German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, by Krystyna Grzybowska; place and date not given: "Partnership Depends Not Only on Us" — questions published in boldface]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Grzybowska] When you were last in Moscow, Yevgeny Primakov, newly appointed Russian minister of foreign affairs, offered you an alliance against the expansion of NATO to the east. What was the reply of — as Chancellor Helmut Kohl put it — Poland's advocate? After all, Germany has played this role in recent years.

[Kinkel] The Federal Government has always supported the policy of opening NATO to new member-states. It also became engaged in processes of institutionalizing cooperation and means of building up confidence between the reforming states of Central Europe and the independent countries of East Europe, on the one hand, and the alliance on the other. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the "Partnership for Peace" program are practical results of this policy.

At the same time, the Federal Government has always made it clear that the expansion of NATO, which in principle has already been decided, is not aimed against anyone and must be incorporated in the pan-European security architecture. In my brief talks in Moscow, I presented this stand to President Yeltsin and to Minister Primakov.

[Grzybowska] After a cool period, caused by the war in Chechnya, German-Russian relations seem to be very close and friendly, although all reformers have been ousted from the Moscow government and the Army has violated all human rights in Dagestan. You supported admission of Russia to the Council of Europe. Does the Russian Federation, which, as is generally believed, fails to meet the criteria of a democratic state, have any special rights in Europe?

[Kinkel] No, it does not! Of course not. I assess the approval granted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as an expression of confidence in the Russians. It is obvious that in the case of Russia, the same norms are applied as in the case of the remaining 38 member-states of this body. However, we must also note that as a fledgling democracy, Russia needs support from its partners on its future road.

Indeed, I cannot be accused of being naive regarding the issue of [Russia] being in the Council of Europe against the backdrop of the Chechen conflict. As the German

foreign affairs minister, I have made clear statements on Russia's stand in the conflict in Chechnya since the very beginning, that is, since December 1994. I clearly criticized the disproportionate actions which were taken to put an end to the hostage drama in Dagestan.

Nonetheless, failures must not compel us to close the European doors and push Russia into isolation. Only if Russia has a permanent place will it be possible to exert influence on democratization processes in this country.

[Grzybowska] Is the German government prepared for a possible failure of Boris Yeltsin in the presidential elections and for a victory of the communists or the nationalists?

[Kinkel] Regardless of the results of the presidential elections, the federal government will aim to have good-neighborly relations and will be ready for close political and economic cooperation with Russia. We link the process of reforms to a specific policy and to its results, not to persons. Incidentally, partnership is a process involving both sides. Russia must make its own contribution to it. We expect that the Russian leadership, headed by the president, who will be elected in June, will unequivocally support continuation of the process of implementing internal reforms and will back cooperation in foreign policy.

[Grzybowska] Does Bonn intend to persuade politicians in Moscow to at least tolerate, if not accept, the expansion of NATO? If it does, how is it going to achieve this?

[Kinkel] It is true that most Russian politicians firmly reject NATO expansion. This results from a wrong evaluation of the alliance, which is still looked upon as a relic of the Cold War. It is also a consequence of the erroneous conviction that the expansion of NATO is aimed against Russia.

We are trying to present a realist picture of NATO to Russia. We are also pinning our hopes on practical cooperation of Russian soldiers with NATO forces in the peace-restoring mission in Bosnia. This cooperation is developing favorably. NATO has given a wide offer to extend the partnership; it is also ready to begin a dialog on security in Europe and to construct this security jointly.

Candidates for NATO members also have a chance — in bilateral relations with Russia — to contribute to making this discussion more objective.

[Grzybowska] Can the current internal crisis in Poland significantly affect Poland's membership in EU and NATO?

[Kinkel] I do not want to comment on issues related to Polish domestic policy. The federal government supports Poland's efforts to join EU and NATO. Cooperation, for example, in the structural dialog and in the "Partnership for Peace" is very satisfactory. Many factors play an important role in the process of leading the countries of Central and East Europe to membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Among those factors are, of course, such considerations as convincing continuation of the reform process in these countries and the issue of democratic control of the Armed Forces. So far there has been no reason for pessimism.

[Grzybowski] Is the Weimar Triangle still working? Will this trilateral cooperation be continued and what can we expect in this area?

[Kinkel] The first visits paid by President Aleksander Kwasniewski in Bonn, Berlin, and Paris emphasized the importance of the Weimar Triangle as the base of the political orientation for our three countries. Germany wants its relations with Poland to be as close as its relations with France are. We are satisfied with the development of the relations with Poland, which is of paramount importance to us from the political, economic, and cultural point of view.

The trilateral cooperation is continuing. There are many future-oriented projects, such as the opening of a joint office of our culture institutes in Warsaw, meetings among young people, or trilateral communication projects: for example, the Paris-Berlin-Warsaw super-highway.

Germany: Role of Franco-German Weapons Agency Outlined

BR0602153096 Paris LE FIGARO (LE FIGARO-ECONOMIE Supplement) in French 6 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by Vianney Aubert: "Launch of a Franco-German Weapons Agency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense cooperation between France and Germany is stepping up. General Delegate for Weapons Henri Conze and his German counterpart will today be laying in Bonn the foundation stone of the Franco-German weapons agency, which received the go-ahead from the two governments at the Baden-Baden summit 7 December last.

This is just a first step. Right now the agency consists of a team of just six people with the mission of drawing up operating rules, defining a legal status which will enable the agency to award contracts, and preparing an implementation timetable. This preliminary work, which

will be completed by July at the latest, should lead to the signing of a bilateral accord.

This treaty will give a new impetus to Franco-German cooperation. This is no new adventure, as witnessed by the long list of bilateral weapons programs, including in particular the launch of the Transall military transport aircraft in 1958, the Alphajet training aircraft in 1969, and the creation in 1979 of the Euromissile consortium. But this cooperation had new blood.

Rationalize

The fact is that, with Aerospatiale and Germany's Daimler-Benz Aerospace (DASA) having undertaken to merge their missile and satellite activities following earlier partnerships in helicopters, the government has been trailing behind. Until now France and Germany have each maintained their own program management structures. The result is that these joint programs look like gas factories. Losses of time and double expenditure are multiplying.

The setting up of a Franco-German weapons agency will make it possible to rationalize the management of the bilateral programs. In this way both ongoing programs — the Hot, Milan, and Roland missiles and the Tigre combat helicopter — and future programs — the modular armored vehicle and the next anti-ship missile — will be brought together under its authority.

New rules and a more rational organization will come into being. France and Germany are giving up the "fair balance" system, under which each partner obtains a share in the manufacturing activity corresponding to its financial participation, and are seeking instead a global, multi-annual balance.

The Franco-German agency is looking to become a driving force in the restructuring of the defense industry, taking care to create manufacturing and technological complementarity between the two countries. Its objective is to encourage the emergence of specialists in each sector and to promote industrial partnerships and mergers. Talks about the rationalization of test resources will also be got under way.

In the longer term, the Franco-German agency should open up to other partners. Already the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Great Britain have expressed their interest. But the lack of commitment of certain of these countries to European preference in their weapons purchases could mean that they will have to wait a little longer.

**Germany: Bonn Urged To Repatriate Serbs,
Albanians**

AU0202160296 Berlin DIE WELT in German
2 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by Helmut Breuer: "Uncertain Fate of
Refugees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Duesseldorf — While public interest in Germany is concentrating on the return of the some 320,000 refugees from Bosnia, the uncertain fate of the 300,000 Serbs and Albanians from Kosovo living in Germany does not attract much attention. Although their return to their home country, which was not hit and destroyed by the civil war, could be effected more quickly and easily, repatriation of these people, who are registered by the German authorities as de facto refugees, will probably take much longer.

One of the main reasons why no solution to that problem — which has probably cost German taxpayers a two-digit billion mark amount — has been found yet, is the fact that Bonn and the other European countries have not yet recognized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is only after this diplomatic act that the new round of negotiations, which are scheduled to be held in Belgrade at the end of February, will produce the first positive results. But EU recognition of the new Serbian state is only one of the obstacles to the refugees' return.

Belgrade now seems to recognize only a fraction of the refugees who have been registered by the German authorities as Serbs or Albanians from Kosovo, as having a right to return. While the Interior Ministry in Duesseldorf estimates the number of these people living in Germany to be some 300,000, of which 65,000 live in North-Rhine Westphalia, the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Bonn only mentions some 120,000 persons. This contradiction does not only result from Serbia's fear, which has been hit severely by the economic embargo, of having to take care of hundreds of thousands of additional citizens. What is also disputed is the citizenship of many of these refugees from the former Yugoslavia, who no longer hold any valid identity documents, and the majority of whom arrived in Germany without passports a couple of years ago. A number of these people from other parts of former Yugoslavia passed through Serbia on their odyssey to the West and were given Serbian documents, which are obviously invalid today.

Like his counterparts in the other laender, North-Rhine Westphalian Interior Minister Franz-Josef Knipske (Social Democratic Party) has urged Bonn to send the 300,000 Serbs and Albanians back home quickly, since most of them are supported exclusively by the local authorities.

France: Paris, Bonn Divided on Russian G-7 Membership

BR0702132296 Paris LE FIGARO (LE FIGARO-ECONOMIE Supplement) in French
7 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by Marie-France Calle: "G-7: The West Supports Yeltsin"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Was it a test of public opinion, a maneuver gone wrong, or another disagreement between Paris and Bonn? While Helmut Kohl announced at the end of last week that France would prepare a plan aimed at making Russia a "full member of the G-7," yesterday Paris denied having any such intentions.

Besides, even in Bonn, the chancellor's proposals have been watered down: "We are thinking about the long-term possibility of transforming the G-7 into G-8, that is all," a spokesman for Kohl's government said.

Precedent

"France wants to see the Russian president and Russia participating in international bodies at the highest level," one senior official at the presidential office said. However he went on to say that "it is a long way from there to bringing Moscow into the group of the world's richest countries, if only because for the time being Russia is incapable of integrating into the world economy."

In short, the G-7 summit scheduled to take place in Lyon in July will not be a G-8 summit. On the other hand, as close colleagues of Jacques Chirac are pointing out, Boris Yeltsin will participate in the summit as an observer, as he has done in previous years. A precedent that Mikhail Gorbachev set back in July 1991...just a few months before the putsch that ultimately brought about his fall and the end of the USSR.

So it is understandable that the West should prefer to bet on Yeltsin's victory, even if it is not convinced of his capacity to get Russia out of the economic slump. Nonetheless it is a delicate business: The G-7 summit will take place between the two rounds of the presidential election in Moscow. "It is clear that the West is betting on Yeltsin getting through the first round," one senior French official said, before adding: "Yeltsin is not perfect and we know it, but we fear the worst after him." [passage omitted]

France: Commentator on U.S. Support for Yeltsin

BR0602153996 Paris LE MONDE in French
6 Feb 96 p 2

[Commentary by Sylvie Kauffmann: "Washington Continues To Support Russian President Unenthusiastically"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Boris Yeltsin," revealed humorist Jay Leno, one of the NBC network's stars, last week, "has finally found the transition stage between communism and capitalism: alcoholism." If the Russian president can still make Americans laugh and even make Bill Clinton himself laugh in response to a witticism made in front of the press, it is increasingly rare for him to cause gales of laughter within the administration. The Russian head of state is now dragging along an image in Washington of a bothersome partner who one is forced — despite everything — to support for want of a credible alternative.

In Russia and the United States 1996 is a presidential election year. While it is highly unlikely that Russian-American relations will be one of the issues in the election campaign in the United States, Bill Clinton nevertheless does not have an interest in having upheavals in Moscow encourage his opponents to publicly raise the following question: "Who lost Russia?"

Therefore the best thing would be to talk about Russia as little as possible and, despite the successive shocks of the December elections, the departure of several reformers, and the violence in Chechnya, Boris Yeltsin remains — in the eyes of the U.S. Administration — the person best placed to ensure the maintenance of a democratic system. Nevertheless, one should not expect to hear his praises being sung in Washington. "We will not support any candidate in the Russian presidential election," a senior American official stated last week. "We can only support the principle of elections." In other words, presenting Boris Yeltsin as America's candidate could only bring grist to the mill of his opponents. The United States will therefore limit itself to restating its commitment to the democratic process and to reforms. This position was confirmed on Sunday, 4 February by two articles published in the American press. The first one, by Strobe Talbott, the number two man at the State Department, a man close to Bill Clinton, and a longtime supporter of rapprochement with Russia, appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES. The second one, an interview with Defense Secretary William Perry by columnist Jim Hoagland, appeared in THE WASHINGTON POST.

One word was conspicuous by its absence in Strobe Talbott's article: Chechnya. At no point was the situ-

ation in the Caucasus mentioned, although Mr. Talbot did mention — on the eve of the meeting between the foreign ministers of both countries, Warren Christopher and Yevgeniy Primakov — the "troubling tendencies" of the current situation in Russia. "Even when the direction of Russian policy is uncertain," Strobe Talbott stressed, "the fundamentals of American policy remains clear (...)" One of these fundamentals is "our support for democracy. It is not up to us to choose Russia's leader. The Russian people are now in a position to do it themselves." In short, as long as the election timetable is respected, as long as the people participate, and as long as the press can express itself, then Washington has nothing to say.

Three Priorities

The American official also listed three priorities of the United States: nuclear security; the concern to not see a fresh division of Europe emerge; and peaceful relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics. Noting that Moscow "is stepping up its calls for the political and economic integration" of these republics, Mr. Talbott said that Washington will only agree to "regional cooperation if it is carried out on a truly and totally voluntary basis."

Going by the same logic, Mr. Perry recognized "the exceedingly difficult transition" facing Russia. So it is of the utmost importance "not to link our policy to any given individual or to any given administration." Washington is trying to leave itself the possibility of maintaining the course of Russian-American relations if Boris Yeltsin is beaten in June.

But despite the measured criticism expressed by Mr. Christopher and his spokesman after the departure of the major reformers from the government in January, and despite the unease created among certain members of the U.S. Administration as a result of the brutality of Russia's latest military operation against the Chechens, Washington wants to continue to believe in the reform process in Russia. A senior official noted that the departure from the government in 1994 of other reformers, such as Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov, did not cause the reforms to be stopped. American support for the IMF loan to Russia primarily serves this goal: creating maneuvering room for Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin by the time of the election in June.

France: Military Officers on 'Fragile' Bosnia Peace
BR0602145596 Paris LE FIGARO in French
6 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by Xavier Gautier: "Peace On Red Alert"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The initial results of the deployment of Western troops in Bosnia are encouraging. Despite the constant delays and threats, the 60,000 Implementation Force troops have done considerable work since Christmas. However, the economic and political reconstruction of the country is a different challenge altogether. [passage omitted]

General Indifference

The current situation is perplexing. In Mostar, EU Administrator Hans Koschnik regularly threatens to resign in the face of the lack of results and the provocation of the breakaway Croats. His appeals are met with a general indifference.

What lies in store for Sarajevo? Despite the Elysee Treaty which officially recognizes "the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its internationally recognized frontiers," the town remains surrounded just as it was at the height of the siege, only without the bombs.

More worrying still is the fact that, piqued at having seen the Croatian and Slovene markets slip through their fingers, French industrial groups have instead signed contracts with the Bosnian Serb Government in Pale whose leaders are suspected of having committed crimes against humanity. British businessmen are just as busy in Belgrade.

Certain Western leaders mutter that the French, who "hold" Sarajevo with 7,500 soldiers, will not apply the pressure that is expected of them to force the breakaway Serbs to give up their dream of a partitioned capital. Zeljko Matic, diplomatic adviser to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, stated: "Without any real political will on the part of the Europeans, peace has no chance."

The European Double Game

A French officer who spent three years in the former Yugoslavia forecast: "A new war is brewing in Bosnia, with new participants and new weapons. However, the rules of the game will be the same." A former European affairs minister was just as pessimistic: "I still come across hard-core Serb supporters in French politics. You get the feeling that the West is playing a double game." That is to say it looks like it is defending the key principles and the right of refugees to return home, but in reality it is accepting the fait accompli of ethnic partition.

So does peace have any chance of winning out in these conditions? Winter, very harsh in Bosnia, is traditionally a time for a pause in the fighting. However, a Bosnian veteran officer said that, in the spring, "if work has not begun on rebuilding a reunited Bosnia and if the blockade against Sarajevo has still not been lifted, then military operations risk starting up again." None of the three warring factions is satisfied with what it obtained. The same officer commented: "The Dayton compromise is very fragile." Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic has already issued a warning: "Nobody can deny the Bosnians the right to defend the whole of Bosnia." In Pale, Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Belgrade the rocket launchers and mortars remain at the ready.

France: Millon on Idea of European Weapons Industry

*BR0602145896 Paris AFP in French
0956 GMT 6 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Paris, 6 Feb (AFP) — Defense Minister Charles Millon stated in Paris on Tuesday [6 February] that "the natural dimension of our weapons industry must be European."

Mr. Millon was addressing the Forum du Futur [Forum of the Future], a strategic think tank led by RPR [Rally for the Republic] Deputy Jacques Baumel which brings together ambassadors, higher-ranking military officers, and deputies.

The minister reminded those present that France no longer had the financial resources "to develop plans on its own in all areas," and of the need to react "rapidly and massively to the toughening of trade war." "It is essential to construct this European weapons industry," the minister stressed, in order to counter a U.S. monopoly in the weapons area."

For Mr. Millon "safeguarding France's manufacturing and technological base requires the construction, by means of alliances, of world-scale European groups."

In this perspective, the minister stressed, "European preference is not an artificial constraint but, on the contrary, an investment in the future." Elsewhere Mr. Millon confirmed that "there was no questioning" of the role the Tiger attack helicopter and the NH-90 transportation helicopter which are part of the European programs.

Mr. Millon also reaffirmed the need "to define a more professional army, able to operate on a world level." "This greater professionalism," the defense minister confirmed, "will not damage our republican model." He repeated that the "civic conscription," which, in the long term, will replace the present national service, "would

restore a sense of universality by putting into practise the principle of a service rendered to the nation by all young men."

The minister also indicated that the extension of this civic conscription to young women "had still to be debated."

He ended by indicating that all activities under the heading of "civic conscription" would respect Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights which states that "no one may be required to undertake an obligatory task, except for the defense of his country."

Finally, Jacques Baumel, rounding up the debates of the Forum of the Future, declared that it seemed to him that there was a need to create a parliamentary body "which could be a special committee with regulatory powers of enquiry and investigation" to discuss the "next and painful revision of our defense system."

France: Government To Issue Statement on EMU 21 Feb

*BR0602141096 Paris AFP in French
0958 GMT 6 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Paris, 6 Feb (AFP) — European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will be the subject of an official government statement to the National Assembly on Wednesday 21 February. A debate will follow. This was announced at the end of the meeting of the presidents [of the political groups within the National Assembly] chaired by National Assembly Speaker Philippe Seguin.

The statement will be issued some time in the afternoon.

France: National Assembly To Host Forum on Embargoes

*BR0602140896 Paris AFP in French
1048 GMT 6 Feb 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Paris, 6 Feb (AFP) — A forum entitled "The Economic Embargoes, The Martyrdom of the Innocents" will be held at the National Assembly on Monday 12 February in the presence of Iraqi and Libyan officials, the organizers announced.

This meeting, organized on the initiative of a support movement for Iraq, "The House of Mesopotamia," will deal with the embargoes imposed on Libya, Iraq, Serbia, and Cuba among others.

As far as Iraq is concerned, the organizers announced the participation of Moham Abdullah Al Duri, the dean of the Law Department of the Baghdad University, Khaled Al Anbaki, the dean of the Political Sciences Department, and Akram Al Watri, a legal counselor at

the Iraqi Foreign Ministry (names as received). A lawyer will represent Libya.

Other French and foreign officials are expected to address the meeting, according to the organizers. Among them are former Socialist Ministers Claude Cheysson and Jean-Pierre Chevenement, former Counterintelligence Chief Yves Bonnet, former Tunisian Foreign Minister Hedi Mabrouk, Cuban Ambassador to France Raoul Roa Kouri, and Serbian diplomat Slobodan Despot.

"The House of Mesopotamia" which was founded in 1994, aims to "highlight the cultural relations between France and Iraq."

France: Will Not Raise Public Services Issue at IGC
BR0602124896 Paris LA TRIBUNE DESFOSES
in French 5 Feb 96 p 4

[Report by Marc Deger: "Intergovernmental Conference: France Will Not Discuss Public Services With Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Alain Juppe who, in the throes of December's social conflicts, had promised to include the notion of public services "in our constitutions, both national and European," is no longer thinking of doing so. First, faced with an outcry within his majority, the prime minister has abandoned the idea of constitutional reform. Today it seems that the head of the government is also preparing to beat a retreat at European Community level.

During his 10 December broadcast on France 2, Alain Juppe declared that the government was "ready to make a proposal for the preamble to the constitution (...) to contain specific wording stating that France will not allow public services to be dismantled by anyone," adding that "there will be (...) negotiations between the members of the EU, at what is called an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), in 1996. We are ready to bring up there too the issue of including the requirement to respect public services in the Treaty on EU."

Until now, during the preparations for this IGC, which is to be launched on 29 March in Turin, France has not called for anything of the kind. Will France do so? The prime minister's office is giving no reply, at most intimating that the IGC agenda has not been fixed. But, at the Foreign Ministry as at the president's office the reply is unequivocal: The IGC will be purely "institutional," as planned by the Treaty of Maastricht.

Franck Borotra, minister responsible for industry, post, and telecommunications, who is currently consulting the trade unions in order "to continue the dialogue on defining public service missions," is continuing to pose the question of whether or not to include the notion of public services in the Treaty on EU. It would even appear that his advisers are actively at work on alternative texts, either with a view to amending the Treaty of Rome as it applies to public services (particularly Article 90), or with a view to an additional protocol to the treaty in the form of a "charter," an idea defended in particular by the European Center of Public Companies.

However, whether for a straight amendment of the Treaty of Rome, or an amendment together with a "charter of economic services of general interest," unanimity will be needed among the Fifteen. The fact is that the top men in the state know very well that it will be impossible to achieve unanimity on this question, given the size of the divergences between the member countries. This is why the Foreign Ministry, supported by the president's office, wants to avoid provoking a major crisis between France and its partners during the IGC, which will be examining the vital problem of the reform of the EU's institutions.

Also, despite denials from the prime minister's office, Alain Juppe no doubt does not want French public opinion, which remains very sensitive on this question of public services since December's social strife, to see him being rebuffed on this issue at European level.

Indeed, it is explained, the IGC is not the place for discussing public services. When the European Commission is accused of an excess of Anglo-Saxon style liberalism, it is often forgotten that it was not the United Kingdom which wrote the Treaty of Rome. For this reason it is not the "legal" wording of the treaty which is being called into question, but the interpretation placed on it by member states. And this is precisely why it appears infinitely more important to know today what tomorrow's Europe, as defined by the IGC, will look like. If the French people were to be called on to give their opinion on the outcome of this IGC, as envisaged by Jacques Chirac during the presidential election campaign, their reply will be political. It is perhaps time, it is being suggested, that political initiative took the upper hand over economic initiative.

Italy: Berlusconi on Maccanico Mandate, D'Alema
BR0502143796 Milan *CORRIERE DELLA SERA*
in Italian 4 Feb 96 p 4

[Interview with Forza Italia Chairman Silvio Berlusconi by Goffredo Buccini in Rome; date not given: "Berlusconi: I Asked for Two Guarantors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rome — "Do you know why this agreement cannot fail? No, why? "Because whoever causes the agreement to fail will certainly lose the election." Berlusconi never stops negotiating. He is more stubborn than ever. To counter the rips, punctures, and gaps, and perhaps above all Fini's impatience, he is using the most effective of glues: Whoever causes a break will pay for it. He admitted that Maccanico's problems are certainly not over, is fighting for two guarantors who can prevent a government of technocrats from falling under Scalfaro's tutelage: "We do indeed need guarantors, for the sake of clarity in the government's relations with the two alignments, in order to prevent any furtive agreements. Everyone must understand this." He remained well-mannered, not responding to the blows that the PDS [Democratic Party of the Left] leader dealt him in conversation with party members. Though tempted to issue a few sharp rejoinders on two key issues — antitrust legislation and equal access regulations — he confined himself to a small dig: "I understand Massimo [D'Alema] and his anxieties about his grassroots. But apart from his remarks — which, I repeat, I understand — his attitudes should display a greater awareness of a law-based state and democracy."

[Buccini] Did you see that America is to abandon antitrust law, to leave the market to dictate the only rules? Be honest: Do you not feel rather envious?

[Berlusconi] You know how it is; here we go against the trend; we move in the opposite direction from the rest of the world. I have been saying so since time immemorial.

[Buccini] Yes, the PDS members who phoned D'Alema live on Italia Radio a few hours ago were much more worried about Fininvest than about Fini. In other words, your television channels still seem to frighten "dear Massimo." How do you see this?

[Berlusconi] The real situation has been turned upside down. The issue has nothing to do with democracy. It is Fininvest that should be worried about so many political and judicial attacks.

[Buccini] Actually D'Alema seems more worried about it, but differently from you. He said that "if an agreement is reached, progress must be made beyond the present equal access regulations." And he did not seem to have in mind a loosening of the rules — on the contrary.

[Berlusconi] Look, there are three points. Antitrust legislation: There was a referendum, and I do not think that we can act against the Italian people's wishes. Conflict of interests: We are waiting for legislation; there was a bill, drawn up by my own government. Equal access: I have rather more to say about this. Yes, the political forces have very limited opportunities to inform citizens. Communication must be increased, and certainly not decreased.

[Buccini] Do you trust D'Alema or not?

[Berlusconi] I perceive on his part a sincere belief in reaching an agreement.

[Buccini] Have you two spoken recently?

[Berlusconi] Diplomatic confidentiality prevents my talking about this.

[Buccini] Let us talk about experts. Are Ciampi and Dini two high-profile experts, or not?

[Berlusconi] Of course they are. But they have occupied senior political posts, as leaders.

[Buccini] So do you veto them?

[Berlusconi] I met with the prime minister-designate today; we talked about the reforms, differences with the French system, financial reform, development, the judicial crisis...

[Buccini] Excuse me for repeating myself, but do you or do you not veto Ciampi and Dini?

[Berlusconi] I will be frank. We must consider the historic fact that we can change the constitutional architecture. Once we have an agreement, then we will talk about names. However, I hope that there are no vetoes capable of bringing down the agreement.

[Buccini] You insist on there being two political guarantors in the government. But Fini seems unconvinced, and D'Alema too...

[Berlusconi] No decision has yet been reached within the Freedom Pole. I proposed this because it is an obvious way of maintaining relations, of averting dishonest forms of pressure and secret meetings. I do not mean by this that I want a super-government; there is no specter of a super-government.

[Buccini] Are you afraid that, without political guarantors, you would find yourself supporting a new edition of the Dini government — in other words, of Maccanico falling under the president's control?

[Berlusconi] It is true, this is a problem. We must all of us examine this together.

[Buccini] Reference being made to some very resolute stances that you adopted against the "powers that be" during your time as prime minister. Have you made peace now?

[Berlusconi] You cannot tar everyone with the same brush. When I was in government I encountered serious difficulties because of the attack mounted by the trade unions, the leading sectors of the press, and Confindustria [Italian General Confederation of Industry]. So I raised the question of changing the country. Now we have this opportunity for change. I am not at war with the powers that be. I have never been so. I like peace. In order to build.

[Buccini] Does Maccanico have a clear path ahead, or are there still some major problems?

[Berlusconi] Not all the problems have been resolved. Goodwill is needed.

[Buccini] An alternative referendum on the form of presidential system seems to be a precondition for Fini. Is it so for you too?

[Berlusconi] It would be a democratic act. But it is not a precondition; we cannot cause a breakdown over this.

[Buccini] It is said that the agreement between the alignments spelled the end for Prodi. Are you challenging a D'Alema who has sacrificed Prodi after a year's progress together?

[Berlusconi] D'Alema has shown courage. He is convinced that what the country needs now is to introduce the reforms.

[Buccini] Is he not a master of chicanery?

[Berlusconi] I think he is a reasonable man.

Italy: Fini on Maccanico Mandate, Berlusconi, D'Alema

BR0502144196 Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian
5 Feb 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Italian National Alliance Chairman Gianfranco Fini by Giancarlo Perna in Rome; date not given: "Maccanico a Neutral Person, Fini Says"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *When it comes to pride, Gianfranco Fini is unrivalled in politics. When I visited his office on via della Scrofa, the AN [National Alliance] chairman was at his desk, with the Italian flag behind him, striking a formal pose suitable for a commemorative postage stamp. It was as though he had been riveted to his seat, like some hunting trophy. His round eyes looked out from an impassive face. His novelty necktie, with a pheasant pattern, lay on his stiff chest. It occurred*

to me that he looked stuffed. But he was alive. Indeed, he stood up to his full height, and proffered me his hand.

Here I must make a diversion. The hand that he proffered me before the interview was slightly clammy. A sign of excitement. When he proffered it again at the end of our meeting it was dry. A sign of confidence. So, behind his apparent coolness, Fini does have feelings. On this basis I built a theory.

Gianfranco has not yet recovered from the shock of being set at the head of a major party when he was by no means ready for it. When Giorgio Almirante felt close to death, he put him in charge of the MSI [Italian Social Movement] at the age of only 36. The task was too great for him. So to carry it out Fini concealed his insecurity behind an impassive mask. That was nine years ago, but his dual personality has remained. On the one hand the haughty leader, and on the other the anxious youngster.

His fear is still apparent from small signs.

During our conversation, which lasted an hour and a quarter, Gianfranco smoked seven cigarettes. Three right away to relax, and the rest at crucial points. Before placing them between his lips he always tapped them two or three times on the desk to settle the tobacco, as though they were the inferior Nazionali of the sixties. It was a pointless gesture with modern super-compact cigarettes, but it revealed the immature youth that is still in him.

As I observed him critically, our interview progressed.

[Perna] It is said that you suggested Antonio Maccanico for the premiership.

[Fini] Yes, in order to overcome the intersecting vetoes. The Freedom Pole proposed Cossiga, Baldassarre, and Scognamiglio, whom the Left found unacceptable. The Left suggested Dini, Ciampi, and Amato, who were unacceptable to us. So I suggested Maccanico, who is acceptable to everyone.

[Perna] A former Republican, a former member of the De Mita circle, a former everything.

[Fini] A neutral person. When his interview in book form was published, he invited both me and Massimo D'Alema to the launch.

[Perna] He is a figure typical of the past.

[Fini] Only a representative of the First Republic can persuade people who feel nostalgic about the past to move forward to the Second Republic.

[Perna] Now you will be supporting a government together with the PDS [Democratic Party of the Left]. Almirante will turn in his grave.

[Fin]i Almirante's last book was titled, "Presidential Republic." This is our objective. When I realized that D'Alema was in agreement, I accepted.

[Perna] Your voters will rebel.

[Fin]i Presidentialism is part of our program. We are playing on our home ground. It is the Left that is in difficulties, since it finds itself on a ground that is more ours than its own. We are merely being cautious: A civil war has broken out between them.

[Perna] How do you know that your voters will follow you?

[Fin]i We are receiving faxes. They say: "Very well. But be careful." They are also full of suggestions about the kind of presidential system that should be adopted. I have discovered that, apart from being experts on soccer, the Italians are also a population of constitutionalists.

[Perna] What kind of presidentialism?

[Fin]i A head of state with powers to guide and steer the government. This is the minimum objective. Otherwise there will be an election. Then, the issue of whether we adopt a French-style system, or something else, I leave to the experts.

[Perna] We will never achieve this in our lifetime.

[Fin]i You speak for yourself. It will be done within a year and a half. Nine months for the proposals for a bicameral committee. Six months to adopt them in both houses of parliament. Three months to hold a referendum of approval.

[Perna] What do you think of D'Alema's sudden conversion to presidentialism and a new government, even though until the last moment he was calling loudly for an election? Is he full of empty talk?

[Fin]i Berlusconi's miracle is to have displayed a force of will and a natural optimism that are extraordinary. D'Alema must have realized that an election would have been like Russian roulette. Even if he had won, he could not have governed, in view of the confusion on the Left.

[Fin]i ends]

Before answering each question, Fini puckered his lips as though about to give a kiss. It is a characteristic that scholars call "chicken's ass" and that denotes anxiety and tension.

[Perna] It is said that, without Berlusconi, the Freedom Pole would disappear.

[Fin]i There is a basis of truth in this. He invented the Freedom Pole.

[Perna] If it were to break its alliance with Forza Italia, the AN would return to the ghetto. The moment you adopted a stiffer stance in recent weeks you immediately drew a hail of charges of neo-fascism.

[Fin]i That is the schizophrenia of the Left. It diabolizes its adversaries, in accordance with its old habit. For six months Berlusconi was the Black Knight, whereas Fini was sufficiently democratic to be invited to the L'UNITA festival. Then when I protested, in order to prevent an agreement on their conditions, the comrades received new orders. They started saying that the Fiuggi congress which dissolved the MSI was not enough, that we had not drunk enough Fiuggi [spa] water in order to purge ourselves completely, and other such nonsense.

[Perna] Why is the charge of fascism an insult, and not so that of communism?

[Fin]i The left-wing culture that has dominated for the past 30 years does not accept the equivalence between fascist totalitarianism and the communist kind. It is a habit that is slow to die among the elite. But among ordinary people peace and dialogue were established long ago.

[Perna] The AN constitution includes a passage which says something like, "we are all sons of Gramsci, too," with reference to the Marxist philosopher. What does that mean?

[Fin]i The AN's blueprint is an ambitious one — to knit together a people's identity. Italians today are the product of the whole of their history. Those on the Right are influenced also by what people on the Left have believed. And vice versa. In this respect we are more advanced than the Progressive forces, who cause themselves stomach ache.

[Perna] But you forgot to say that you are also sons of Mussolini. Was this a sly precaution?

[Fin]i We made a list of philosophies and representatives of culture. Mussolini was a politician.

[Perna] But his busts and photographs are still on display in your offices.

[Fin]i Just as you will find Lenin and Marx in those of the PDS. Symbolism is slower to die, even when the ideologies have disappeared. [Fin]i ends]

Pleased with this thought-provoking observation, Fini rewarded himself with a cigarette, which, after the first puff, inspired the following lofty reflection: "If a constituent period begins now, the post-war era really will be over. We did not contribute to the Constitution of the First Republic, and were left on its sidelines. By contributing to the creation of the Second Republic

we will belong to it fully. This is more important than achieving 22 percent in the election — two points more than the opinion polls say — or having three ministers in the Maccanico government. I am setting my sights high. [Fini ends]

A quiver passed round the room, stirring the pheasants on Fini's chest.

[Perna] Which politician do you hold in highest regard?

[Fini] All the evolutions that have taken place in the past two years are thanks to Berlusconi. He entered the arena as an anti-politician and has brought radical and extraordinary changes into politics.

[Perna] Do you trust D'Alema?

[Fini] I cannot say either that he is completely honest or that he is completely dishonest. But I am duty-bound to ascertain his willingness to accept change.

[Perna] Will Di Pietro enter politics?

[Fini] Like every other citizen, he is entitled to do so.

[Perna] Do you hope that he will?

[Fini] No. I am waiting for him to decide. He has merits as a magistrate. As a politician, I do not know him. I do not know what his programs are, apart from the three letters that he wrote to LA REPUBBLICA. They do not amount to much.

[Perna] He is very popular.

[Fini] That is what Cossiga calls the "kangaroo effect." If a kangaroo walks down the street, everyone looks at him. Then if the kangaroo looks back, people look at him even harder. Last, if he signs an autograph, he becomes the most popular of all. This is the nature of popularity.

[Perna] What are your ambitions for the future?

[Fini] To consolidate the AN's success and to achieve a genuine two-party system.

[Perna] To enter government?

[Fini] A politician does not necessarily have to do this. For instance, I would not feel equal to the post of finance or treasury minister.

[Perna] Perhaps you lack a statesman's temperament. When you were disappointed by the local election results last year you became depressed and fled abroad for three days. (Behind his imperturbable exterior, I perceived a glimmer of antipathy that accentuated his bad mood).

[Fini] I am only human. A moment's disappointment is more than natural. If I had stayed away a month and

someone had had to come to fetch me, then I would understand your question. As things stand, it is foolish. [Fini ends]

He stood up and said good-bye, like someone who has much more important things to do.

Italy: Northern League's Bossi on Proposed Reforms

LD0702141096 Rome RAI Radio Uno Network
in Italian 1200 GMT 7 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Maccanico is at work in the prime minister's office here at Montecitorio [Chamber of Deputies]. He is working simultaneously on the two parts of the government program: constitutional reforms, and political, economic, and financial priorities, a document which will then be subjected to examination by the political parties.

But the prime minister designate is also continuing with his series of meetings and discussions in preparation for the second round of consultations with the parliamentary groups tomorrow and the day after. Maccanico hopes to reach a conclusion and break his silence by the end of the week. This morning he had a series of discussions, among which was one with Northern League leader Umberto Bossi. This is what he said to us.

[Begin recording] [Bossi] A reform of the Constitution must first look at the form of the state, and then various other things such as the form of the government and the electoral law.

[Reporter] Do you see room for an agreement between the opposing positions of [National Alliance president] Fini and D'Alema [Democratic Party of the Left secretary]? Has Maccanico given you any idea about that?

[Bossi] That I don't know. The fact is that effectively they both have similar problems. It seems to me that in order to avoid the opposing positions paralyzing us all there should be a committee formed by both chambers of Parliament which could, let us say, [words indistinct] the fact that it produces, indicates a series of reforms. These partial, or very partial reforms, could become constitutional bills to be passed by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] French style presidential system. Do you want that to be withdrawn or are you in agreement with that?

[Bossi] No, let them create an Italian-style presidential system. [end recording]

**Denmark: Government Handling of EU Issues
'Outdated'**

BR0502120096 Copenhagen POLITIKEN in Danish
2 Feb 96 p 1

[Report by Lars Olsen: "Danish EU Line Is Outdated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Foreign Ministry's "coordination" of day-to-day EU policy issues has become obsolete. If Denmark's interests in Brussels are to be looked after in the best possible way, individual ministries such as the ministries for agriculture, the environment, and labor must take responsibility themselves for their respective part of day-to-day EU policy.

It is Denmark's highest ranking civil servant in the EU, Niels Ersboll, who is outlining a radical new way of thinking about Denmark's handling of EU matters.

"The EU has become domestic policy. Why not do what is normal for domestic policy? After all, nobody wants the Foreign Ministry to coordinate what the Agriculture Ministry does at home. Today the Foreign Ministry has become the coordinator of what is often more than half of the other ministries' everyday life," Niels Ersboll told POLITIKEN.

Mountains Of Paper

In 1973-77 Niels Ersboll was Danish ambassador to the EC, and from 1980 to 1994 he was secretary general of the EU Council of Ministers in Brussels, and last week he was appointed Denmark's negotiator at the Intergovernmental Conference on the EU's future treaties. In the Foreign Ministry's anniversary publication, "New Borders," Ersboll questions the way in which the Danish EU process is organized.

Today the Foreign Ministry plays a crucial role in all 32 of the EU's special committees, whether they discuss toxic sprays in groundwater, safety equipment in cars,

or support for shipyards. At the same time contacts with the Folketing's Europe Committee have a crucial role in the Foreign Ministry's work.

"The result is an enormous amount of reports, notes, and papers that occupy the Foreign Ministry's resources to an extent that the politicians barely realize. The ministry's work is dominated by an almost total prioritization of the everyday political process that will guarantee support from the rank and file.

"This support is important in itself but should the Foreign Ministry carry such a large share of the burden? Take the environment, for example, where Svend Auken is a very visible minister who runs his EU policy independently and efficiently. Formally the Foreign Ministry still has the role of coordinator, but as in all other countries it has gradually become the ministries which in reality handle the EU issues."

Ersboll believes that the result is too much duplication in effort and that resources are taken up that could be used better.

Lack of Knowledge

The Foreign Ministry ought to a greater extent provide "inspiration for overall policy" instead of getting involved in the large number of specific issues:

"Denmark's big problem is that we lack a debate on where Europe should go. The Danish debate gets lost in specific issues that are of current interest. Our greatest problem in relation to our EU partners is a lack of knowledge of and respect for their points of view.

"Today European cooperation bears the stamp of crisis and confusion. There is a need for an old-fashioned diplomatic effort to gain an understanding of what is going on in the other EU countries," Niels Ersboll said.

Greece: PASOK Parliamentary Crisis Debate Summarized

NC0602224096 Athens Elliniki Radiofonika Radio Network in Greek 2200 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The marathon meeting of the PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] Parliamentary Group ended with the speech by Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis. An 11-hour debate proved that we can have free discussions, the prime minister said after the end of the meeting and added: This debate was proof of our unity and that, despite our disagreements, we can handle things together. Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos described the debate as positive, noting that we are entering a new era of Greek-Turkish relations in which unity, seriousness, and responsibility are needed. National Defense Minister Yerasimos Arsenis stressed that doubts were resolved and that the Armed Forces are in a high degree of readiness and combat fitness. Our correspondent Khrista Tavoulari has the following report:

[Tavoulari] Following an 11-hour marathon debate the PASOK Parliamentary Group meeting ended at approximately 2200 [2000 GMT] today. Coming out of the meeting, Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis said he was particularly satisfied with the meeting. He noted: If some people thought that it would be a meeting of confrontations and disagreements, we proved that we can have free discussions and that unity prevails within PASOK.

However, during the 11 hours of the meeting, there were some very tense moments when a number of deputies criticized the government handling, and most of them pointed out that, at least with regard to the impressions given the public, the government should have been more careful. Particularly strong positions were taken by deputies Sifounakis, Vrettos, Akritidhis, Galanos, and Alexandros-Mangaki.

On their part, Yerasimos Arsenis and Theodoros Pangalos answered a series of questions put by deputies. The national defense minister stressed that in the conversation he had with his U.S. counterpart the flag issue was not broached and noted that all Greek ships were deployed on the night of 30 January. Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos pointed out that in his conversation with Richard Holbrooke they only discussed the withdrawal of forces. Both ministers held that the landing of Turkish commandos did not affect developments.

It should be noted that Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis, in his report at the meeting this morning, stressed events of the night of 30 January, saying: The

question we had to answer last Wednesday morning was whether Greece would proceed with a general uncontrolled conflict or whether it would proceed with the disengagement of the armed forces. However, Mr. Simitis noted, it must be made clear that a clash would be a trap, as it would lead to the very negotiations wanted by the Turks. The prime minister also said that now our country's answer must be decisive. He noted: We make no claims, but we will not concede anything; we do not provoke, but we do not retreat.

We should also note that another issue was also raised at the Parliamentary Group meeting. Many deputies also took positions on the replacement of National Bank Governor Mirkos by Theodoros Karatzas, which appears to have met resistance.

Greece: Defense Council Extends Armed Forces Alert

NC0402170496 Athens Elliniki Radiofonika Radio Network in Greek 1600 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Defense Council has decided to increase surveillance all along our border in order to prevent any new incidents by the Turkish side. [passage omitted] Our correspondent Alkis Malidhis has the following report:

[Malidhis] The Greek Defense Council reportedly discussed the possibility of this Turkish provocation climaxing with the provocation of a hot incident in the Aegean. The Defense Council consists of National Defense Minister Yerasimos Arsenis and the chiefs of the General Staff offices.

In order to prevent such an incident Greek Armed Forces remain on alert and special measures have been taken to guard the rocky islets. Within this framework, the cancellation of personnel transfers in Units 95B and 95C, which have already spent six months stationed on the border, is being examined.

Also the reinforcement of the occupation military forces in Cyprus is causing concern among National Defense Ministry officials.

Over the next few days important developments are expected regarding the military leadership that may even lead to changes in the high command. Arsenis is preparing a report that will lay the blame for allowing Turkish commandos to set foot on Imia.

New Democracy is blaming the government for the defeatist atmosphere that it claims has arisen. [passage omitted]

Turkey's Baykal: Greece 'Eager' To Create New Tension

TA0602200296 Ankara TRT Television Network
 in Turkish 1800 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Deniz Baykal, foreign minister and deputy prime minister, has declared that Greece is trying to create new, artificial tension in the Kardak region. Baykal expressed the hope that the extraordinary movement in this area will not go beyond a reflection of Greece's emotional reaction.

Addressing his party's assembly group meeting today, Baykal remarked that the military and political authorities displayed great cooperation with regard to the Kardak crisis and the incident ended without any bloodshed thanks to correct analyses and policies. Pointing out that there is a void concerning the many islets, rocks, and islands in the Aegean, Baykal said that the issue was moved to the international arena as a result of the Kardak crisis and it became clear that the Greek argument is incorrect. Although the old status has been restored on the subject of Kardak, Baykal noted, Greece is eager to create new tension.

[Begin Baykal recording] At this time, when the incident in the Kardak region should have been concluded, we regretfully observe that there is still an atmosphere of nervousness and artificial tension. There is still extraordinary movement around the Kardak island. We see that a state of nervousness and an appearance of tension characterize the situation in that region at this moment. I hope that this will not go beyond reflecting the emotional reaction triggered by the known outcome of the Kardak crisis. We find it appropriate to interpret this current state of tension and nervousness as the reflection of the emotional reaction caused by this particular conclusion of the Kardak crisis. Within this framework, we are also exerting efforts aimed at normalizing the situation facing us as soon as possible. We believe that Greece must also demonstrate such efforts. [end recording]

Turkey: Anti-Turkish Propaganda in Bulgaria Seen

TA0702090896 Ankara TRT Television Network
 in Turkish 1800 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Turkey has announced that it maintains the hope that Bulgaria will not allow the escalation of anti-Turkish propaganda or the increase in ethnic tension.

Replying to a question on the annulment of the Kurdzhali local elections, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Omer Akbel pointed out that in Bulgaria, there are extremist elements who carry out propaganda based mainly on ethnic discrimination. He said that this propa-

ganda began with the start of official local election propaganda and went on until the Kurdzhali court canceled the election results. He explained that this propaganda is generally anti-Turkish and anti-Turkey. He went on to say that as a neighboring country, Turkey follows the developments in Bulgaria closely, and wants the Turkish minority to play the role of a bridge of friendship between the two countries.

Rasim Musa, candidate of the Rights and Freedoms Movement, won the post of mayor in Kurdzhali in the local elections. A court decision canceled the election results in Kurdzhali yesterday, and ordered the renewal of elections there.

Turkey: Parties' Efforts To Form Government Described

NC0602193596 Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish
 5 Feb 96 p 10

[From the "Window" column by Yavuz Donat: "The Ankara Report" — clippings as published]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Suleyman Demirel told Motherland Party [ANAP] leader Mesut Yilmaz: "I owed you Mr. Yilmaz. First, I want to pay my debt... You transferred the prime minister's office to me four years ago. Please, take this envelope."

The envelope contained the official document labelled "The Designation of Mesut Yilmaz To Establish the New Government." He responded:

—Mr. President, thank you.

Demirel said:

—Mr. Necmettin Erbakan and Mrs. Tansu Ciller have been unable to establish the new government. It is your turn to try to do so.

—The way we see things, the outcome of the 24 December elections has not given any of the political party leaders the right to say that he or she has "the right to serve as the prime minister." That also applies to the political parties themselves.

Demirel interrupted Yilmaz as follows:

—Yes, I completely agree with your views. Considering that the strongest political parties got only 19, 20, or 21 percent of the vote, no one can claim that he or she has "a right to be prime minister."

Mesut Yilmaz asserted:

—Under the existing conditions, a coalition government can be established only through reconciliation.

Demirel said:

—Yes, any reconciliation must provide for the National Assembly's vote of confidence.

Mesut Yilmaz said:

—We are convinced that the office of prime minister is one of the most important factors in any effort for a reconciliation.

Demirel responded:

—It is your turn now. Democracy provides the necessary basis for agreements. Considering the existing situation, a reconciliation is essential.

Mesut Yilmaz asserted:

—I have stressed that several times since the night of the elections. Reconciliation requires sacrifice. No reconciliation can be reached if one of the parties insists on "being appointed prime minister."

Demirel said:

—Reconciliation will not work if it remains in words only. I will look for two things: The first is whether reconciliation will be sure to receive the National Assembly's vote of confidence. In other words, that this government will be able to secure the support of 276 deputies. The second is if the government will be able to work in harmony.

Mesut Yilmaz responded:

—You can rest assured that I will do my best.

Demirel asserted:

—I am aware that the politicians will have a difficult time. Nevertheless, all the problems can be resolved within the rules. Otherwise, it is quite clear what has to be done. New elections will have to be held.

We have conferred with Prime Minister Tansu Ciller. She insisted on her views.

—Mr. Yilmaz has two options. They are the True Path Party [DYP] and the Welfare Party [RP].

—Can you not be a little more flexible? For example, can you not be more flexible about the appointment of a "third person as prime minister?"

—That can be considered in "three months," in other words it can be considered for an election government.

—Will you definitely object to considering the "third person" in any other case?

—Yes, that is right. I am not the one who proposed the "three-month period." It was proposed by someone else.

—You must mean the "Cankaya Government," which will be established when the 45-day period expires. That is, you must have meant the election government.

—Yes.

—Your relations with Mr. Yilmaz are gradually worsening.

—I should not be blamed for that. I believe that Mr. Yilmaz is suffering from a very serious psychological obsession.

—Can you comment on the DYP's internal situation?

—It seems from the outside that the DYP is troubled by a problem. However, it must be realized that it is a very individual matter... In fact, not even that. The DYP is not like it used to be.

—How can you reach an agreement with Mesut Yilmaz?

—We must not personalize politics. We must act in accordance with the realities.

—Can you be more explicit?

—A political party cannot be asked to agree to something it cannot accept.

—Can you not be a little more flexible? For example, on the question of the "third person?"

—No, we cannot be flexible. Mr. Yilmaz should first hold talks with RP leader Necmettin Erbakan. He should then meet the representatives of the other political parties. That is when he will have the right to hold talks with the DYP. He should discuss the undemocratic models with Necmettin Erbakan.

—Do you believe that Mr. Yilmaz will establish a coalition with the RP?

—He can do whatever he likes. Let him do so if he prefers Erbakan to Ciller. He has the responsibility for the establishment of the new government. However, it would be a pity for him, his party, and the country.

We met Mesut Yilmaz and asked him to explain his "plan for the establishment of the new government."

—The ANAP Parliamentary Group's executive committee and chairmanship council will meet tomorrow (today). Our parliamentary group will meet on Tuesday [6 February] morning. I will hold talks with Republican People's Party leader Deniz Baykal in the afternoon and then with Necmettin Erbakan. I will hold talks with the other political party leaders on Wednesday. We will be able to make our "final assessment" by the weekend.

—What proposal do you plan to make to Tansu Ciller?

—I cannot comment on that.

—Is it a secret proposal?

—The matter requires sacrifice. We—that is Mrs. Ciller and I—must agree to make sacrifices. She cannot impose anything on me. Nor can I impose anything on her.

—Is it true that reaching an agreement is becoming more and more difficult?

—If our relations are seen as "like those between two countries," then it is just like "establishing a confederation." A reconciliation is required to appoint the head of the new system.

—Why has the naming of the prime minister become so important for an agreement?

—Because of Tansu Ciller's insistence.

—Can you please explain that?

—The Constitution allows the prime minister to act as a coordinator. It also allows the establishment of the Council of Ministers on the basis of joint responsibility. However, Tansu Ciller has converted the prime minister's office into "an institution that controls all the ministries." The prime minister's office approves even the most insignificant appointments. That even applies to the most insignificant funds that are allocated to the ministries.

Tansu Ciller continues to oppose Mesut Yilmaz and he has a very inflexible approach to Ciller. They do not trust each other at all. We asked Yilmaz to explain how the existing state of affairs can be changed?

—Ciller acquired property in a foreign country while serving in the government. She has not been able to disclose how she acquired her property. So, she must not expect us to trust her until she is exonerated.

This dispute may affect the National Assembly's structure. Has a similar situation ever existed in the past? We hope that the leaders will refrain from stretching the rope so taut. Unfortunately, hope is not enough. The rope is being stretched more and more every day.

Turkey: Ecevit Meets Yilmaz, Comments

TA0602181896 Ankara TRT Television Network
in Turkish 1510 GMT 6 Feb 96

[News conference by Turkey's Democratic Left Party leader Bulent Ecevit with unidentified correspondents after a meeting with Motherland Party leader Mesut Yilmaz at the Turkish Grand National Assembly — live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Ecevit] I wished Mr. Yilmaz success in his work. It appears that overcoming the

difficulty in establishing a government depends above all on reaching an agreement or conciliation between the Motherland Party [ANAP] and the True Path Party [DYP]. There is also the option of a government that would include the Welfare Party [RP]. For reasons known to you, we do not recommend such a model. Mr. Yilmaz has been aware of our stand on this matter from the beginning. The public's actual expectations focus on an agreement between the DYP and ANAP on a government model.

There are three options. The first is an agreement on a rotational premiership, as they cannot agree on one person's premiership. The second is equalizing the powers of the prime minister and the deputy prime minister. The third alternative would be rotational minority governments set up by these two parties.

According to our impression based on previous contacts, the DYP and ANAP are most likely to reach agreement on the third option — namely, rotational minority governments. The question is only over the order in which the parties will assume the task. In our view, this is a mere detail that can easily be overcome. During my meeting with Mr. Yilmaz today, I proposed that he exert renewed efforts to overcome this detail. Naturally, the results of Mr. Yilmaz's efforts to establish a government will emerge only after his meeting with Mrs. Ciller. I believe that this is why Mr. Yilmaz does not want to make a statement before his meeting with Mrs. Ciller.

In line with the expectations of a large sector of the public, we reiterated our desire for these two parties to agree on a government model. I am convinced that this is not an insurmountable difficulty. I hope that after his meeting with Mrs. Ciller, Mr. Yilmaz will be able to give us good news.

[Correspondent] Did Mr. Yilmaz make a proposal to you?

[Ecevit] What kind of proposal?

[Correspondent] Regarding a minority government, a coalition between ANAP, the Democratic Left Party [DSP], and the Republican People's Party, or between ANAP and the DSP? Did he ask you to contribute to a possible coalition with the Welfare Party [RP]?

[Ecevit] No. He knows that we will not contribute to a coalition with the RP. We reiterated this view during this meeting as well.

[Correspondent] You exchange views with the ANAP leader frequently. In your opinion, is ANAP planning to set up a coalition with the RP? Will ANAP hold final talks with the DYP? What is your impression on

this manner? Will ANAP definitely engage in a coalition with the RP?

[Ecevit] I did not observe such determination. ANAP is holding on to this option. It is not my impression that they are very keen. In all his statements on the subject, Mr. Yilmaz notes that this is the most difficult option. I believe that both the DYP and ANAP agree on the necessity of a government to be established with their approval, but they are having difficulties reaching agreement on certain details which do not appear so important to us but are apparently important to them. We believe that they must certainly reach an agreement, be it on a traditional coalition model, the equalization of the powers of the prime minister and the deputy prime minister, or a rotational minority government.

[Correspondent] You said that a rotational minority government model is preferable to the two parties. How will the problem of who will be first be solved? Did you make a proposal?

[Ecevit] We discussed various possibilities. It is up to him and to Mrs. Ciller to assess these options. We cannot dictate a solution to them.

[Correspondent] Did you mention a third name for prime minister? This is the deadlock in the government talks.

[Ecevit] During his first meeting with me when the process to establish a government began, Mr. Yilmaz declared that he was open to a government under the premiership of the DSP leader. During today's meeting, he reiterated that he could accept this option should it become necessary. I am not in a position to give a reply, because it depends on Mrs. Ciller's approval.

Today's press reports are not very promising in this regard. Ciller is reported as saying: If Mr. Yilmaz makes such a proposal, I will not accept it. We can consider it only if Mr. Ecevit himself makes such a proposal. For this to happen, the president must assign Mr. Ecevit the task of establishing the government.

In other words, Mrs. Ciller does not appear to be very eager on the subject. This is her right. Such a solution would involve our assuming a very serious responsibility. If such a task befalls us, I would take it to the authorized party organs in a bid to avert a government crisis and preclude the need for a government with the RP. As I said, this is a very serious responsibility, and I do not have the right to accept or reject this on my own.

[Correspondent] Do you view Ciller's statement in the press today as a negative approach or could it be an appeal to Mesut Yilmaz, denoting that she would accept

a government under the premiership of Ecevit if it is he who makes the proposal?

[Ecevit] I cannot say. Everyone can interpret this differently. Mrs. Ciller has already clearly stated that she will definitely not accept a government led by a third person, whether he be from the DYP, ANAP, or an outside party. I am interpreting her remarks in the light of these statements.

[Correspondent] Mrs. Ciller has changed her statements since last week. I understand that if you go to her with the proposal, she will say yes.

[Ecevit] It would not be right for me to make predictions on the subject or comment on hypotheses. As I said, when I interpret today's reports in the light of Mrs. Ciller's previous clear statements, I reach the conclusion that she is not very keen; however, I do not know what her real intentions are. She is clearly declaring that she will say no to any such proposal from Mr. Yilmaz. The rest depends on various possibilities.

[Correspondent] There are possibilities, but do you want the president to assign you the task of forming the government? If you are tasked, will you bring these two parties together?

[Ecevit] At this stage, I cannot comment on this subject. I do not think it is appropriate to make recommendations to the president in this regard. I cannot know what the honorable president will do if Mr. Yilmaz fails to resolve the government issue, and I do not find it appropriate to make any suggestions.

[Correspondent] Should Mr. Yilmaz ask it of you, can you make such a proposal to Mrs. Ciller without being assigned to form the government?

[Ecevit] No, I cannot do that. This proposal did not originate from our party. From the beginning, it has been an option described by Mr. Yilmaz as acceptable to his party. It is also an option that has been rejected by Mrs. Ciller so far, according to my understanding. We did not and cannot make such a proposal. This is a very grave responsibility. If this becomes a proposal on which both Yilmaz and Ciller agree, then I will take it to our authorized organs. I would not find it right to undertake such an initiative myself.

[Correspondent] Mr. Yilmaz had said that he will make a proposal that cannot be refused and that does not involve elections, the RP, or ANAYOL (acronym meaning main path, based on a combination of elements in ANAP and DYP). Did he mention such a proposal to you?

[Ecevit] No, there was no such thing. (passage omitted)

[Correspondent] In light of your past experience, would you support a government formula that would result from possible defections by some 20 DYP deputies?

[Ecevit] I view this as a totally unreliable expectation, both on the basis of my general observations and my past experience. If a government is based on certain transfers, which would create apprehensions and suspicions, a shadow would be cast on it from day one. My meeting with Mr. Yilmaz today left me with the impression that he does not have such expectations. He only expressed the hope that certain DYP deputies would support certain government formulas. He did not give me the impression that he is expecting transfers. Thank you very much.

Turkey: DYP Council Meets on Transferring Deputies

TA0702080196 Ankara TRT Television Network
in Turkish 1800 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The True Path Party [DYP] Chairmanship Council has announced that disciplinary procedures will be carried out against those DYP National Assembly group and General Administrative Council members who damage party unity.

The DYP Chairmanship Council held two separate meetings today, the first under leader Tansu Ciller, and the second under deputy leader Mehmet Golhan.

The statement issued by the Chairmanship Council was presented at a news conference by DYP deputy leader Hasan Pekel. The statement says that the methods and speaking styles of the leaders designated to establish a government are being assessed by the nation. It says that the democratic attitude adopted by Tansu Ciller shows a maturity that will be noted in Turkish political history.

[Begin Pekel recording] During Mrs. Ciller's efforts to establish a government, no one could talk of such a political disgrace as deputy transfers. With its 50 years of political experience, the DYP knows that political ethics do not allow interference in other parties' internal affairs. In its mission, the DYP has never considered the respected members of other parties, especially the elected deputies, as political tools that can change sides for certain interests, no matter what they are. Nor will the DYP consider them such tools in the future. The DYP considers such acts and intentions the greatest democratic disgrace, and views the stand of those who encourage such acts to be political avarice by those who desire a faulty political structure. [end recording]

The statement says that any transfers that take place after today will never be considered acts of principle, and that the nation will see them as interest-motivated.

The statement points out that the deputies who serve in the authorized party bodies have the opportunity to air every kind of idea freely. It adds that if these ideas are announced to the public through the media and if they reach dimensions that hurt party discipline, necessary action will be taken immediately.

The statement says that the determination of the authorized party bodies are behind all of the government formulas posited by party leader Tansu Ciller. It adds that the party is opposed to every idea that questions the party leader's premiership.

[Begin Pekel recording] We will closely follow those who hurt our party's unity at the DYP National Assembly Group and General Administrative Council or those who make statements that give such an impression. Disciplinary action will quickly be taken against them. [end recording]

Turkey's Erbakan: Government Without RP 'Impossible'

TA0702070496 Ankara TRT Television Network
in Turkish 1800 GMT 6 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Welfare Party [RP] leader Necmettin Erbakan has said that in terms of arithmetic, content, and psychology, it will be impossible to set up a government without the RP. He also said that his government will be closed to formulas such as rotation.

Addressing the RP National Assembly group, Erbakan said that the government on duty has resigned and is on its way out, so it must take every step carefully. He said that if the RP comes to power, it will review the steps taken by the current government in connection with appointments, tenders, and privatization.

He charged that while governments in the past used to be established by following the normal order of things, this time, when his party emerged as the largest party, all rules and conventions are being pushed aside.

Erbakan said that True Path Party [DYP] leader Tansu Ciller who was given the task of forming a government after him failed in that task, and that it is impossible for Motherland Party [ANAP] leader Mesut Yilmaz to get any results from his current efforts. He charged that a government to be established by the four parties other than the RP will constitute a continuation of the past, and that the people do not want that. If they insist on that, he warned, they will have a stillborn government.

Erbakan stressed that the people want change and they want it from the RP. He added: The name of this change is the RP. Unless the new government is established by the RP, among other things, it will

not succeed psychologically. All the facts point in one direction: A new government must be established under the leadership of the RP as soon as possible.

[Begin Erbakan recording] During the establishment of that government, there will not be any rotations, shmotations. This idea was made up by a handful of capitalists who live off the interest on their capital and who insist on the impossible ANAYOL [acronym meaning "main path," based on combination of elements in ANAP and DYP]. Where in the world is there such a thing? It is being said that two parties that were close to each other during a war in Israel did it. Exceptions do not change the rule. This does not mean anything. Many coalitions have been set up in many parts of the world up to today. Many coalitions have been set up in Turkey as well. Was there ever such a thing as rotation, shmotation? [end recording]

Discussing the surveys conducted by his party, Erbakan said that according to them, 70 percent of the people want an RP-ANAP coalition. He added, however, that the RP is ready for possible elections, and that the surveys show that the party would receive close to 33 percent of the vote if early elections are held.

Erbakan said that in the effort to establish a government, it is time to leave aside the impossible and to move toward the possible. He stated that the kind of coalition that will be set up will become clear before the Ramadan holiday.

[Begin Erbakan recording] In concluding my remarks, I want to mention one point once again. The RP does not in any way force anyone or insist on becoming government. In fact, if we consider our party under the current conditions, it will make the RP a much greater giant not to tackle these conditions, to let these other parties tackle them and thus clearly show that they are incapable of doing anything, and then go to elections. We know this for a fact. As you see, the man in the street will now vote for us by 28, 33, 35 percent. This figure could easily rise to 40 and 50 percent. For this reason, at the end of efforts made over a month and a half, I say to the other parties: If you are going to set up something among you, do not waste time, do it. However, if you cannot set it up, leave aside your theories. The way this business can be concluded is obvious. Let us act maturely, and bring a reasonable solution to life as soon as possible. [end recording]

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